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This thesis consists of three essays that have the common theme of examining the 
connection between household consumption/finance choices and macroeconomic 
performance. The first essay examines how housing consumption and elasticity of 
housing supply could affect equity risk premium and housing risk premium. It 
provides both theoretical predictions and empirical evidence for the connection 
between asset risk premia and elasticity of housing supply. The second essay 
investigates how the cross-sectional variations of housing supply elasticity have 
implications on households’ portfolio composition. It finds that households living 
in areas with less elastic housing supply invest more in stocks for the purpose of 
hedging housing consumption risk. Lastly, the third essay examines competitive 
consumption and labor supply behavior of young males in China in connection to 
sex ratio imbalance.  
The first essay extends the housing consumption-based asset pricing model in 
Piazzesi et al. (2007) to a production economy, where housing consumption is 
endogenous with respect to both aggregate productivity shocks and housing 
supply elasticity. The role of housing as a consumption good in shaping asset risk 
premia is re-examined. In contrast to the exchange-economy case where the 
presence of housing introduces an independent consumption composition risk to 
elevate asset risk premia, adding housing to the consumption basket in a 
production economy introduces a substitution benefit that mitigates consumption 
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risk and lowers asset risk premia. Moreover, lower housing supply elasticity 
makes housing price more volatile in response to productivity shocks, thus 
reducing the equity risk premium via enhanced substitution benefit but increasing 
the housing risk premium via elevated consumption risk. Empirical analysis 
using land share of home value as proxy for aggregate housing supply inelasticity 
in the economy shows that a lower housing supply elasticity predicts lower excess 
stock returns but higher excess housing returns, especially in the long-horizon (6-
12 quarters) return forecasts. Besides clarifying the role of housing in 
consumption-based asset pricing models, these findings also provide an 
alternative explanation for the declining equity risk premium observed in recent 
decades.   
The second essay uses geographic variation of the housing supply elasticity to 
account for housing consumption risk and investigates the influence of such 
risk on households’ portfolio composition. A portfolio choice model with both 
housing and nonhousing consumption is developed to demonstrate that the 
optimal holding of the risky assets is additionally motivated by households’ 
hedging incentives against unfavorable housing price shocks. Such motive is 
dependent on location and household lifecycle: it is stronger in places with less 
elastic housing supply and for young households who are on the rising path of 
their lifecycle housing consumption profile. Data from recent waves of PSID in 
the US provide empirical support that that households living in metropolitan areas 
with less elastic housing supply invest a relatively larger fraction of their financial 
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wealth in risky assets (stocks), and this effect is more pronounced for the young 
households. These results suggest that financial asset provides important 
means for households to hedge against housing consumption risk, in addition to 
the means provided by homeownership adjustment shown in the extant literature. 
The third essay is motivated by the work of Wei et al. (2011), which shows that 
the substantial increase in household saving in China since late 1990s may have to 
do with a rising male-female sex ratio. They find a higher sex ratio in a region in 
China makes parents with a young son save more for the son’s expenses, such as 
wedding, education and housing, to help the son compete in local marriage 
market.  Two hypotheses are examined in this essay. First, marriage market 
competition makes young males spend more where the sex ratio is higher – they 
may do so with financial support from their parents. Second, young males in high 
sex ratio regions would also work harder, so that their earning would rise faster, in 
order to pay back their parents in the future. A large dataset of credit card account 
information of individuals across 31 provinces in China is employed to test these 
hypotheses. It is found that an additional percentage point in regional sex ratio of 
age 20 to 34 in 2005 is associated with two to three percent higher credit card 
balance for males in this cohort but not for females. In addition, young males’ age 
profile of income is steeper in provinces with higher sex ratio. These findings are 
consistent with the proposed hypotheses and suggest that the rising sex ratio in 
China may also have contributed to China’s high GDP growth through 
competitive consumer spending and labor supply by young males.   
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
Three essays in this thesis explore the connection between household 
consumption/finance choice and macroeconomy performance. In particular, essay 
one and essay two examine how housing as a consumption good and housing 
supply elasticity could affect asset risk premia and household asset allocation 
respectively, and essay three investigates how sex ratio imbalance in China affects 
the consumption and labor supply behavior of young males. This chapter provides 
a broad context of these studies, where the research motivation and intended 
contribution are highlighted.   
1.1. Overview of the Research 
Housing is not only the dominant wealth component of most households, but also 
the major component in the household’s consumption basket. Given the dual role 
of housing as both consumption goods and asset, the finance literate has 
increasing recognized that housing play an important role in affecting asset risk 
premia and household’s portfolio choice. For instance, recent studies has shown 
that considering the unique features of housing help us to understand the 
determinants of asset risk premia, e.g., Grossman et al. (1990) and Flavin et al. 
(2008) pay particular attention to the transaction cost of housing, Yogo (2006) 
and Piazzesi et al. (2007) focus on the nonseparability of nondurable consumption 
and durable (housing) consumption, and Lustig et al. (2005) emphasize the role of 
housing as collateral to transmit shocks in housing market to risk premia. 
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However, these studies normally follow the exchange economy setting of Lucas 
(1978) where the supply of asset is fixed. In the portfolio choice literature, 
Brueckner (1997) pioneers works on examining how housing as both a 
consumption good and an asset can affect asset allocation
1
. Although studies 
belonging to this strand of literature differ in their particular focuses, they are 
generally confined in either the mean-variance framework of Markowitz (1952) or 
the life-cycle choice model of Samuelson (1969) with exogenous specifications of 
return and price processes, meaning that the feedback from the investment 
demand on the supply of asset is absent.  
While the extant studies mostly focus on the demand side of housing, the general 
equilibrium effects rising from the supply side of housing are largely overlooked 
at the present. Why the effects arising from the supply of housing is important for 
our understanding of the role of housing in shaping asset risk premia and 
influencing household asset allocation? First, the supply of housing is the other 
side of market forces that clear the housing market and determine the price of 
housing. Importantly, it has been found that the price elasticity of housing supply, 
which is one of the indicators measuring the supply condition of housing market, 
is crucial in affecting housing price level, volatility, persistence of housing market 
cycles (Glaeser et al. (2006), Glaeser et al. (2008), Huang et al. (2012), and 
Paciorek (2013)). Therefore, the processes of asset return and price, and the 
                                                 
1
 See also, e.g., Cocco (2004), Englund et al. (2002), Flavin et al. (2002), Flavin et al. (2011), Hu 
(2005), Iacoviello et al. (2003), Quigley (2006), Yamashita (2003), and Yao et al. (2005). 
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correlations among them, which are purely exogenous but critical in the Lucas’ 
“tree” model and portfolio choice models aforementioned, depend on the supply 
condition of housing market via the housing supply elasticity. Second, the 
housing supply elasticity not only has substantial variation across regions that 
could be attributable to differences in either physical and geographical constraints 
or regulatory practices (Glaeser et al. (2008), Green et al. (2005), Ortalo-Magné 
et al. (2011), Quigley et al. (2005), and Saiz (2010)), but may also have secular 
declining trend due to factors like limit amount of developable land, increasing-
restricted man-made regulations on housing development, and population 
concentration in big cities
2
. The time- and geographic variation of housing supply 
elasticity, which would result in time- and geographic variation of housing price 
and the correlation between housing price and asset returns, must have 
implications on intratemporal and intertemporal tradeoff of household 
consumption, and thus affect household’s demand for risk premia and 
household’s portfolio composition.       
How does the housing supply elasticity affect asset risk premia and household’s 
asset allocation? These questions are not fully addressed in the literature but the 
answers are important because: (1) asset risk premia, which are not observable, 
are fundamental in corporate finance and household finance; with the relative ease 
                                                 
2
 Although time-series estimations of housing supply elasticity are hardly attainable, Sinai (2010) 
provides circumstantial evidence of declining elasticities in the U.S. He reports that average 
elasticity of housing supply, measured as the average ratio of the average house price growth over 
the prior 20 years to the average housing unit growth in each MSA, range from 0.77 over the 
1950–1970 period to 0.99 over 1980–2000, indicating “that housing supply in the United States 
became more inelastic, or less price responsive, over this period” (see Table 1 therein). 
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of measuring the housing supply elasticity, understanding its relation to asset risk 
premium would help to forecast asset risk premia; (2) the efficiency of 
consumption smoothing directly depends on the optimality of asset allocation; 
understanding how the portfolio choice should adjust according to local housing 
supply elasticity would help to allocate asset optimally and achieve the goal of 
smoothing consumption.  
The research gap and the importance of answering the questions mentioned above 
motive the first two essays of the thesis. Particularly, the first essay asks and 
answers how the housing supply elasticity affects asset risk premia, and the 
second essays asks and answers how the housing supply elasticity affects the 
household portfolio composition.  
In the first essay, two important theoretical implications are found based on a two-
sector general equilibrium model with housing supply: First, different from an 
exchange model where the presence of housing consumption elevates the equity 
risk premium through an independent composition risk (Piazzesi et al. (2007)), 
housing consumption in a production economy introduces a substitution benefit 
and hedge demand for stocks that lower the equity risk premium. Second, because 
the housing price is more volatile if the housing supply is less elastic, lower 
housing supply elasticity reduces the equity risk premium via enhanced 
intratemporal substitution effect but increases the housing risk premium via 
elevated consumption risk. Empirical analyses using land share of home values as 
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proxy for housing supply elasticity support the model predictions: a lower 
housing supply elasticity predicts lower excess stock returns but higher excess 
housing returns, especially in the long-horizon (6-12 quarters) return forecasts.  
The second essay addresses the question about the link between housing supply 
elasticity and household portfolio composition. With a portfolio choice model 
containing both nonhousing and housing consumption, it demonstrates that lower 
housing supply elasticity causes households investing more in stocks for the 
purpose of hedging housing consumption risk. This model implication is 
supported by empirical analyses using the recent waves of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) in the U.S. and Saiz (2010)’s measure of housing 
supply elasticities in 269 MSAs. It is found that households living in MSAs with 
less elastic housing supply indeed invest a relatively larger fraction of their 
financial wealth in risky assets (stocks). In addition, young households on the 
rising path of housing consumption profile especially do so because they are 
facing more housing consumption risk.  
The background and motivation for the third essay are different from the first two 
essays. It is under the context of rising sex ratio imbalance in recent decades in 
China and motived by the work of Wei et al. (2011), which argues that the 
substantial increase in household saving in China since late 1990s is attributable 
to the rising male-female sex ratio. While Wei et al. (2011) shows that parents 
with a son have competitive saving motive to improve their son’ relative standing 
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in the marriage market, the third essay presents the other side of the story by 
asking whether the young males themselves have competitive spending motive. In 
addition, the third essay asks whether the sex ratio imbalance impacts males 
working efforts. Empirical analyses using a large dataset of credit card account 
information of individuals across 31 provinces in China show that an additional 
percentage point in regional sex ratio of young adults (20 to 34) is associated with 
two to three percent higher credit card balance for males in this cohort but not for 
females. This supports the hypothesis that young males spend in a competitive 
manner to attract marriage partners. It is also found that young males’ age profile 
of income is steeper in provinces with higher sex ratio. Overall, these findings are 
supportive to the proposed hypotheses. They suggest that the rising sex ratio in 
China may also have contributed to China’s high GDP growth through 
competitive consumer spending and labor supply by young males. 
1.2. Intended Contribution 
This thesis consists of three essays that aim to deepen our understanding of the 
connections between household consumption/finance choices and macroeconomic 
performance. The three essays shed light on the relation between housing 
consumption/supply and asset risk premia, housing consumption/supply and 
household portfolio choice, and competitive spending and sex ratio imbalance, 
respectively.   
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The first essay enhances our understanding of how housing consumption can 
affect asset risk premia. In particular, it clarifies that adding housing consumption 
into the consumption basket in a production economy lowers asset risk premia, in 
contrast to the conclusions in an exchange economy setting of Piazzesi et al. 
(2007). Consistent with the theory, this essay also first shows that lower housing 
supply elasticity, measured by higher land share of home value, predicts lower 
equity risk premium but higher housing risk premium. Note that the aggregate 
housing supply elasticity has been declining due to the gradual exhaustion of 
developable land and increasing population concentration in big cities, the 
positive correlation between housing supply elasticity and equity risk premium 
provides an alternative explanation for the declining equity risk premium 
observed in recent decades
 3
. This understanding of the link between the housing 
supply elasticity and asset risk premia enables us to have a better vision about the 
trend of asset risk premia. If we expect the housing supply elasticity continue to 
trend downward, we would also expect that the equity risk premium would stay 
on its declining trajectory.  
The second essay first establishes the link between the housing supply elasticity 
and household portfolio choice. It highlights that through the dependence of asset 
return correlations and housing consumption risk on the housing supply elasticity, 
the optimal asset allocation is not location-independent. It thus not only 
                                                 
3
 See, e.g., Blanchard et al. (1993), Campbell (2008), Claus et al. (2001), Fama et al. (2002), 
Jagannathan et al. (2001), and Lettau et al. (2008).  
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contributes to the portfolio choice literature by providing explanations for 
geographic variations in households’ asset allocation, but also has important 
practical implications for the finance service sector. By showing the demand for 
equity investment to hedge against housing consumption risk, this study suggests 
a promising demand for financial innovations, such as housing futures and option 
contracts tied to regional housing price index (Case et al. (1993)). As population 
continues to concentrate in larger and denser metropolitan areas, where housing 
supply elasticity tends to decrease, such demand is likely to increase.  
The third essay advances our understanding of the impact of sex ratio imbalance 
on social and economic variables. In particular, it demonstrates that sex ratio 
imbalance results in higher credit card spending and more working efforts of 
young males, for they have to compete to attract marriage partner. These results 
are complementary to Wei et al. (2011), and are informative for our 
understanding of China’s high GDP growth, for that it may have to do with young 
males’ competitive consumer spending and labor supply behavior induced by sex 
ratio imbalance.  
1.3. Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized as followed: Chapter 2 presents the first essay 
titled “Asset Risk Premia in a Production Economy with Housing”, which 
explores the effects of housing consumption and housing supply elasticity on 
asset risk premia; Chapter 3 contains the second essay titled “Portfolio Demand 
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and Housing Consumption Risk Hedging: Evidence from Geographic Variations 
in the Housing Supply Elasticity”, which examines how housing supply elasticity 
has impact on household portfolio composition; Chapter 4 presents the third essay 
titled “Competitive Consumption Spending and Labor Supply: Evidence from 
Regional Differences in Sex Ratio in China”, which investigates the connection 
between the consumption and labor supply behavior of young males and local sex 
ratio imbalance. The final chapter, Chapter 5, concludes the thesis, with highlights 




Chapter 2. Asset Risk Premia in a Production Economy with 
Housing 
 
Abstract: This chapter investigates the covariation between asset risk premia and 
elasticity of housing supply in a production economy. In contrast to the result 
based on an exchange-economy model (Piazzesi et al. (2007)), the consumption 
composition risks here are not independent of nonhousing consumption growth so 
that the presence of intratemporal substitution between nonhousing and housing 
consumption actually has the effect of mitigating consumption risk. Moreover, a 
lower housing supply elasticity makes housing price more volatile in response to 
productivity shocks. It thus increases the housing risk premium via elevated 
consumption risk but reduces the equity risk premium via enhanced intratemporal 
substitution effect. Empirical analyses verify the connections between asset risk 
premia and elasticity of housing supply. Using the land value share of home value 
as proxy for the housing supply elasticity, I show that lower housing supply 
elasticity predicts lower excess stock returns but higher excess housing returns, 
especially in the long-horizon (6-12 quarters) return forecasts. 
 
Key words: risk premium, housing consumption, housing supply elasticity 




The housing supply elasticity, as documented in the housing literature, plays 
important roles in affecting the housing price level and volatility, the persistence 
of housing market cycles, and urban forms (Fu et al. (2010), Glaeser et al. (2006), 
Glaeser et al. (2008), Huang et al. (2012), and Paciorek (2013)). However, few 
studies have explored the implications of the housing supply elasticity on asset 
risk premia. Although several studies in the finance literature has found that 
housing affects asset risk premia in multiple ways (e.g., Lustig et al. (2005), 
Piazzesi et al. (2007)), they are silent about effects arising from the supply side of 
housing due to the exchange economy setting of Lucas (1978). Because asset risk 
premia are driving forces of asset price volatilities and the invisible hand behind 
households’ decisions on consumption and saving, and because the housing 
supply elasticity has not only significant geographic variations but also secular 
time trend, establishing theoretical linkages between the housing supply elasticity 
and asset risk premia is of great importance for understanding cross-sectional 
differences in and time-series profiles of household finance. However, this is an 
underexplored area in the literature.    
To fill the gap, a general equilibrium model with production and housing supply 
is proposed to examine how asset risk premia change with the housing supply 
elasticity. Following Piazzesi et al. (2007), this paper assumes (1) agents have 
power utility and consume both nonhousing goods and housing service that are 
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aggregated as a consumption bundle of a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) 
form, and (2) the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between nonhousing 
goods and housing service is greater than the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. However, the model in the paper differs from Piazzesi et al. (2007) 
in two important aspects. First, the current model features aggregate productivity 
shocks in a production economy. This is important because it implies that the 
growth of nonhousing consumption and its relative quantity to housing 
consumption are theorectically linked, rather than  being independent as in an 
exchange economy. Second, as the intratemporal elasticity of substitution in a 
CES function is tied to the price elasticity of demand, this paper assumes an 
intratemporal elasticity of substitution less than one such that the implied price 
elasticity of demand for housing, as suggested by empirical evidence, is also less 
than one. Following the loglinear-lognormal asset pricing approach in Jermann 
(1998) and Lettau (2003), I first derive expressions for clear understanding of the 
determinants of asset risk premia in the model, through which I first clarify the 
role of housing consumption in shaping the asset risk premium and then I analyze 
the covariation between the housing supply elasticity and asset risk premia.  
Similar to Piazzesi et al. (2007), it is shown that the risk premium for an asset 
consists of two components, with the first component reflecting the consumption 
risk in a model without housing (e.g., CCAPM; called “consumption risk” 
hereafter) and the second component arising from adding housing to the 
consumption bundle. However, the second component in a production economy 
13 
 
setting actually introduces a substitution benefit that lowers the equity risk 
premium, a result opposite to that in an exchange-economy case where the 
presence of housing introduces an independent consumption composition risk that 
elevates the equity risk premium (Piazzesi et al. (2007)). In particular, because the 
price of housing service is higher in face of aggregate productivity shocks, the 
intratemporal substitution of nonhousing consumption for housing consumption 
results in a higher demand for nonhousing goods. Therefore, if an asset whose 
payoff is denominated by numeraire goods has higher return in face of shocks, it 
helps to meet the increased demand for nonhousing goods and thus commands a 
lower risk premium.  
These results suggest that understanding the formation of asset risk premia in fact 
requires attention not only to the specification of investor preferences, but also to 
the specification of shocks. An open question about the Housing-CCAPM in 
Piazzesi et al. (2007) is whether it is reasonable to assume shocks to the 
nonhousing consumption growth and shocks to the expenditure ratio of 
nonhousing to housing consumption are independent
4
. A positive shock to 
nonhousing consumption growth implies an increase in equity return and wealth, 
which in turn increases the demand for housing and thus the housing rent; if 
nonhousing and housing are substitutes, then depending on whether the 
intratemporal elasticity is larger or smaller than one, the increase in the housing 
                                                 
4
 The validity of independent sources of uncertainty to nonhousing consumption growth and the 
expenditure ratio has been questioned by others (see, e.g., Donaldson et al. (2007)) 
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rent implies an increase or decrease in expenditure ratio of nonhousing 
consumption to housing consumption. In short, there are theoretical linkages 
among nonhousing consumption growth, equity returns, and the expenditure ratio. 
If a shock affects the nonhousing consumption growth and the expenditure ratio 
simultaneously, as in the production economy featuring aggregate shocks in the 
paper, it turns out that the asset pricing implications of the Housing-CCAPM are 
opposite to those in an exchange setting in which shocks could be independent.  
Except for clarifying the role of housing consumption in affecting the asset risk 
premium, the primary aim of this study is to understand how a decrease in the 
housing supply elasticity has effect on the asset risk premium. Due to factors such 
as limited amount of developable land, increasingly-restricted man-made 
regulations on housing development and population concentration in big cities, 
the housing supply elasticity may decrease over time. For example, Sinai (2010) 
provides circumstantial evidence of declining elasticities in the U.S. housing 
market
5
. Although the secular trend of the housing supply elasticity is endogenous 
to the factors aforementioned, for simplicity, in the model we consider exogenous 
changes in the housing supply elasticity. The explicit consideration of housing 
supply suggests that supply condition in the housing market affects asset risk 
premia through its impact on the marginal rate of consumption (MRS) and the 
                                                 
5
 Sinai (2010) reports that average elasticity of housing supply, measured as the average ratio of 
the average house price growth over the prior 20 years to the average housing unit growth in each 
MSA, range from 0.77 over the 1950–1970 period to 0.99 over 1980–2000, indicating “that 
housing supply in the United States became more inelastic, or less price responsive, over this 
period” (see Table 1 therein). 
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volatility of housing return. For example, when the elasticity of housing supply is 
low, the agent understands that the housing service cannot be increased in time of 
need, so they have to substitute nonhousing consumption for housing 
consumption. This will decrease the MRS, which in turn may result in lower asset 
risk premia through substitution benefit the asset provides.  
However, because the overall effect of changes in the housing supply elasticity on 
asset risk premia depends on the relative strengths of the consumption risk and the 
substitution benefit, it is shown that lower housing supply elasticity results in 
lower equity risk premium but higher housing risk premium. In particular, 
because inelastic housing supply amplifies housing consumption risk in relation to 
aggregate productivity shocks, lower housing supply elasticity enhances the 
substitution benefit provided by equity investment and it thus makes equity 
investment more attractive and lowers the equity risk premium. For the housing, 
because its return is more volatile when the housing supply elasticity is low, 
inelastic housing supply results in an increase in the consumption risk that 
dominates the increase in the substitution benefit and hence it increases the 
housing risk premium via elevated consumption risk.  
Empirically, the land value share of home value in the U.S. estimated by Davis 
and Heathcote (2007) is used as proxy for the housing supply elasticity, as the 
model suggests that higher land value share implies lower housing supply 
elasticity. Being consistent with the theoretical analysis, it is found that the land 
16 
 
value share of home value helps to predict (negatively) excess stock returns and 
(positively) excess housing returns, especially in the long-horizon (6 – 12 quarters) 
return forecast. The negative correlation between the land value share (or the 
positive correlation between the housing supply elasticity) and the equity risk 
premium suggests the decreasing of the housing supply elasticity in general could 
potentially account for the declining of the equity risk premium in the U.S. stock 
market, a fact documented and discussed in the finance literature
6
. As the 
populations continue to concentrate in large and dense cities and the developable 
land gradually exhausts, which together would result in a downward trend of the 
housing supply elasticity, we may expect the equity risk premium to continue to 
stay in its declining trajectory
7
.  
In terms of contributions, this paper extends the analysis of Housing-CCAPM 
developed by Piazzesi et al. (2007) in a production economy setting and helps to 
clarify the role of housing in affecting asset risk premia in a production economy 
as opposed to an exchange economy. In addition, by showing the theoretical and 
                                                 
6
 For example, Blanchard et al. (1993), Claus et al. (2001), Fama et al. (2002), and others have 
argued that the equity risk premium should be substantially lower than the historical average of 
excess return of 7-8% (see also Campbell (2008), Jagannathan et al. (2001), and Lettau et al. 
(2008)). For a recent estimate, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional 
Forecasters in the first quarter of 2014 found that the predicted median annual-average return on 
stocks (S&P500) is 6% over the next 10 years. While Treasury bills will return 2.5% annually 
over the same period, the forcast implies a much lower risk premium of 3.5% compared to the 
historical average of 6.8%. See http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-
of-professional-forecasters/2014/survq114.cfm 
7
 Recent studies in the housing literature show that there is an upward trend in land share of home 
values. For example, Glaeser et al. (2005) and Davis and Heathcote (2007) both show that the land 
value shares were substantially higher in the recent decades than in the 1950s. As we will show in 
Section 2.2, higher land value share means lower housing supply elasticity.  
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empirical evidence that the declining equity risk premium is linked to the lower 
housing supply elasticity, this paper suggests an alternative explanation for the 
declining equity risk premium.  
Although Jaccard (2011) also investigates the implications of housing supply on 
asset risk premia, this paper differs from Jaccard (2011) in two important aspects. 
First, I derive analytical expression for the asset risk premium. Compared to ex 
post excess returns calculated from simulated moments in Jaccard (2011), the 
analytical expression provides clearer understanding about the formation of asset 
risk premium, the role of housing supply and the conditions under which asset 
risk premia increases (decreases) with the housing supply elasticity. Second, this 
paper allows for more general utility specification than Jaccard (2011), which 
specifies a Cobb-Douglas form for the consumption bundle of nonhousing 
consumption and housing service. It turns out the effects of housing supply 
elasticity on asset risk premia crucially hinge on specification of utility function.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the model is presented in Section 
2.2, where the asset risk premium is defined and the role of housing consumption 
is highlighted; Section 2.3 presents model calibration and discussion of the 
numerical result, followed by empirical tests of the model implications in Section 




2.2.1. Asset Risk Premium: A Definition 
According to the first order intertemporal optimality condition, an asset with gross 
return tR  must satisfy the Euler equation:  
  1 1 1t t tE M R      (1) 
where 1tM   is the stochastic discount factor in a model and dependent on the 
specification of utility function. It represents the present value of an extra unit of 
numeraire consumption tomorrow. As we will see below, a nonseparable utility 
over nonhousing and housing consumption results in a stochastic discount factor 
that is a function of both nonhousing consumption growth and changes in the 
relative quantity of nonhousing consumption to housing consumption. 
Let 
f









   (2) 
Define also the risk premium for an asset with expected return  1t tE R   as the 
difference between the log of the expected asset return and the log of risk free rate: 
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     11 ln lnrp ft t ttr E R R     (3) 
If we use the lower case with time subscript to denote the log of a variable, e.g., 
 lnt tr R  and  lnt tm M , and assume that tM  and tR  are jointly lognormal 
and homoskedastic, the Euler equation (1) suggests that the log of the expected 
asset return can be expressed as: 
  1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
ln ( ) var ( ) ( ) var ( ) cov ( , )
2 2
t t t t t t t t t t t t tE R E r r E m m m r      
 




Using (2), we have the log of risk free rate: 
 1 1
1
( ) var ( )
2
f
t t t t tr E m m 
 
   
 
  (5) 
Equation (3), together with (4) and (5), implies that the asset risk premium is 
determined by the conditional covariance between the (log of) stochastic discount 
factor and the (log of) asset return: 
 1 11 cov ( , )
rp
t t ttr m r      (6) 
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2.2.2. Nonseparable Utility Specification and Its Asset Pricing 
Implications 
Consider a representative agent model in which the agent has an infinite lifetime 
and a preference of the standard form over the aggregate consumption  ,t tG C H : 










   (7) 
















 is the period power utility function with   being 
the relative risk aversion, or equivalently, with 1   being the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution of the aggregate consumption. Following Piazzesi et al. 
(2007), assume the aggregate consumption  ,t tG C H  is a quantity index that 
aggregates nonhousing consumption tC  and housing service tH , and it has the 
form of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
8
: 
    
1 11 1 1
, 1t t t tG C H C H

  
   
   
 
  (8) 
                                                 
8
 In what follows, the nonhousing consumption is treated as numeraire consumption, and the terms 
“nonhousing” and “numeraire”  are used interchangeably.  
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where   is the share parameter for non-housing consumption, and  represents 
the intraperiod elasticity of substitution between non-housing and housing 
consumption.  
The CES preference over nonhousing and housing consumption implies that the 
marginal utility of nonhousing consumption is a function of nonhousing 
consumption as well as its relative quantity to housing consumption. As shown in 
Piazzesi et al. (2007), it follows that the stochastic discount factor in the model 
depends on both the growth of nonhousing consumption and the growth of its 








































          
         
  
 (9) 






   
 
, we can obtain the 
following expression for the log of the stochastic discount factor
9
: 
       1 1 1 1lnt t t t t t t tm c c c h c h              (10) 
                                                 
9
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 being the 
implicit price of housing service at time t  implied by the intratemporal choice.  In 
this paper, I follow Piazzesi et al. (2007) and assume the intratemporal elasticity 





  ) so that 0t 
10
. As can be seen from equation (9) or equation (10), 
the value of the stochastic discount factor (or pricing kernel) is high if nonhousing 
consumption tomorrow is low. In addition, the present value of extra nonhousing 
consumption is high if the relative quantity of nonhousing consumption to 
housing service tomorrow is high.  
Substitute (10) into (6), we have the expression for the asset risk premium in the 
model with housing consumption: 
     1 1 1 1 11 , ,rp t t t t t t t ttr Cov c r Cov c h r             (11) 
Equation (11) suggests that, in a model with housing consumption, the asset risk 
premium consists of two components. The first component reflects the 
consumption risk in the conventional CCAPM. If the return of an asset is high 
                                                 
10
 As argued by Piazzesi et al. (2007), the assumption that elasticity of intratemporal substitution 
is greater than elasticity of intertemporal substitution (𝜀 > 𝜎) means that the agent is more willing 
to substitute housing and nonhousing consumption within a period than he is to substitute the 
overall consumption bundles  between periods. This assumption is in line with observations that 
households are prone to consumption substitution within a certain period. Empirically, Pakoš 
(2011) finds the intratemporal substitutability (0.18) between nondurable goods and service flow 
from the stock of durable goods is greater than the intertemporal substitutability (0.04). 
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(low) when the nonhousing consumption is high (low), then agents require a 
positive risk premium to hold this asset because it fails to hedge against the 
consumption risk. The second component reflects how the housing could play 
roles in affecting asset risk premium. It depends on how the relative quantity of 
nonhousing consumption to housing consumption is correlated with asset returns. 
Given that 0t  , incorporating housing consumption into a consumption-based 
model would lower the risk premium of an asset if its return is positively 
correlated with the relative quantity 1 1t tc h  .   
We can further simplify equation (11) to have a better understanding of the 
determinants of asset risk premia. The linear approximation approach in the 
perturbation theory suggests that the logs of endogenous variables in a model can 
be written as linear functions of the logs of the state variables, with coefficients in 
the front of the state variables being interpreted as the elasticities of endogenous 
variables with respect to changes in state variables (see, e.g., Campbell (1994), 
Judd (1996), King et al. (1988), Lettau (2003), Schmitt-Grohe et al. (2004), and 
Uhlig (1998)). In fact, these functions are conventionally called “policy 
functions”. For example, the policy function for the nonhousing consumption at 
time 1t    can be written as: 
 1 ,1 1, ,2 2, , , , 1...t c t c t c k k t c tc c s s s            (12) 
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where the constant in the linear function ( c ) denotes the steady state value of 
nonhousing consumption (in log); ,x k  denotes the elasticity of endogenous 
variable x  with respect to the kth state variables ,k ts  in the model  (more precisely, 
the log deviation of the state variable from its steady state), and ,x denotes the 
elasticity of endogenous variable x  with respect to the shock 1t
11
. The 
elasticities of endogenous variables reflect how agents optimally react to changes 
in state variables and shocks. For instance, if , 0.05c  , then the numeraire 
consumption at time 1t   is 5 percent above its steady state level in response to 1 
unit of shock. Similarly, the housing consumption and the asset return at time 
1t    can be written as: 
 1 ,1 1, ,2 2, , , , 1...t h t h t h k k t h th h s s s            (13) 
 1 ,1 1, ,2 2, , , , 1...t r t r t r k k t r tr r s s s            (14) 
Substituting (12), (13), and (14)  into (11), we can express the asset risk premium 
in terms of these elasticities and the variance of the underlying shock 
2 : 
 2 2, , , , ,1 ( )
rp
c r t c h rtr              (15) 
                                                 
11
 We will discuss the state variables and the shock of the general equilibrium model in this paper 
when we complete the model with production sectors and the supply of housing service. 
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Similar to equation (11), equation (15) suggests that the asset risk premium has 
two components and depends on the responsiveness of consumption and asset 
return to the shock, namely, the elasticities of nonhousing consumption and 
housing consumption with respect to the shock ( ,c  and ,h ) and the elasticity 
of the asset return with respect to the shock ( ,r ). If an asset return has an 
elasticity of the same sign with the elasticity of numeraire consumption, then the 
first term in (15) is positive, reflecting the consumption risk in the CCAPM. The 
second component 2, , ,( )t c h r      , again, is related to the housing 
consumption.  If the period consumption utility is separable in nonhousing and 
housing ( 1 

  ) such that 0t  , the second component is zero and the 
consumption risk is sufficient to determine the asset risk premium. However, 
assuming that the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is greater than the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution ( 1 

  ) such that t  is positive, we 
note that the second component is negative (positive) if the asset return is 
positively (negatively) correlated with the relative quantity of nonhousing 
consumption to housing consumption ( , ,c h  ). If an asset return reacts to a 
shock in the same direction as the numeraire consumption (e.g., , 0c   and 
, 0r  ), but at the same time housing consumption responds more than 
nonhousing consumption to the shock such that , , 0c h   , then the second 
component is positive, reflecting the “composition risk” proposed in Piazzesi et al. 
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(2007). In this case, incorporating housing into the model increases the asset risk 
premium. However, if the numeraire consumption is more responsive to shocks 
such that , , 0c h   , then the second component is negative and considering 
housing in the model lowers the asset risk premium. We will return to this point 
when we discuss the numerical results in Section 2.3.  
Except for clarifying the role of housing consumption in affecting the asset risk 
premium in a model featuring aggregate shocks, the primary objective of the 
paper is to understand how the housing supply elasticity affects asset risk premia. 
More explicitly, the question is how the elasticities of the endogenous variables of 
interest in equation (15) and thus the asset risk premia change with the housing 
supply elasticity. To accomplish this, I next add production sectors and the supply 
of housing service to complete the model. 
2.2.3. Complete the Model with Production Sectors and the Supply of 
Housing Service 
Assume the production sectors are composed of two sectors: the non-housing 
sector and the housing sector. The output in the nonhousing sector can be divided 
between nonhousing consumption and capital investment, while housing service 
is produced by the housing sector. The production technology in the non-housing 
sector is represented by the AK production function: 
  1 , 0 1bt t tY A K

     (16) 
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where tY  is the gross production in the non-housing sector that can be used for 
both consumption and investment; 1
b
tK   is the production capital in the 
nonhousing sector and it is predetermined at the period 1t  ;   determines the 
output elasticities of  1
b
tK  , and  tA  is the stochastic productivity level. It follows 
that the gross return on production capital is:  
  1
1




     (17) 
where k  is the depreciation rate of production capital.  
Assume the productivity level is the only aggregate uncertainty in the economy 
and it follows an AR(1) process: 
     21ln ln ,     ~ (0, )t a t t tA A N     (18) 
where a   measures the persistence of productivity process and 
2  is the 
variance of the technology shock.  
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Furthermore, assume that there is one unit of land in the economy, which is not 
depreciable and is combined with the production capital (structure) in the housing 
sector 1
h
tK   to produce housing service
12
: 
  1ht tH K

   (19) 
where 0 1   determines the structure share in the cost of housing service, or 
equivalently, 1   presents the share of land value in the cost of housing service. 
In fact,    also governs the responsiveness of the supply of housing service to 
changes in the price of housing service h
tD  and the gross return on capital 
k
tR . To 
see this, note the optimal allocation of capital between the nonhousing sector and 
the housing sector requires that the marginal product of capital are equalized in 









     (20) 
Equation (20) implies a housing supply function, with the price of housing service 
and the gross return on capital as its arguments: 
                                                 
12
 The assumption that land supply is fixed at one unit is not unrealistic if we consider that the 
total amount of land in a country is normally unchanged overtime. Because the housing service is 
generated by land and the structure attached to it, this assumption also implies that one unit of land 
is required as input for producing one unit of housing service but the marginal product of land 
increases as 𝜑 decreases. As the land generate revenue (1 − 𝜑)𝐻𝑡𝐷𝑡
ℎ, the land price 𝑃𝑡
𝑙  satisfies 
𝑃𝑡
𝑙 = 𝐸𝑡(𝑀𝑡+1(𝑃𝑡+1
𝑙 + (1 − 𝜑)𝐻𝑡+1𝐷𝑡+1
ℎ )) and can be solved from this equation. However, I do 
not discuss the property of land price in this model.     
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        ln ln ln ln 1
1 1 1
h k




    
  
  (21) 









  (22) 
Note that because 0 1  , (0, )  . Importantly, a smaller   implies both 
higher share of land value in the cost of housing service but lower housing supply 
elasticity – a negative correlation that is supported by empirical evidence.  
Given (16), (18), and (19), the representative agent’s problem is to  optimally 
choose nonhousing consumption tC , and allocate the production capital in the 
nonhousing sector 
b
tK  and the production capital in the housing sector 
h
tK , 
subject to the budget constraint (23), such that the expected consumption utility is 
maximized: 
  
0{C , , } 0
max ,
b h














   1 11b h b ht t t t t tC K K Y K K          (23) 
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The first-order conditions of the maximization problem indicate that: 
                 ' ' 1 1 1
1
, , 1bc t t t c t t t t kU G C H E U G C H A K

    
  
    
  
  (24) 
              
1
' ' '
1 1 1 1, , , 1
h




   
 
    
        
(25) 
where   ' ,cU G C H  and   ' ,hU G C H  are the first order derivatives of  
 ( , )U G C H  with respect to its first and second argument. Equation (24) and (25) 
represent the intertemporal tradeoff of consumption and savings and the optimal 
allocation of production capital in the two sectors, respectively. Together with 
equation (16) - (19), and equation (23), they define a general equilibrium model 
under rational expectation, with the production capital 1
b
tK   and 1
h
tK   being the 
endogenous state variables, the productivity level tA being the exogenous state 
variable, and all of the rest being endogenous variables.  
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In the next section, I calibrate the model and solve the elasticities in equation (15) 
numerically using Dynare
13
. This will allow us to understand the relative 
responsiveness of consumption and asset returns to shocks and how the housing 
consumption plays a role in affecting the asset risk premium. Importantly, as  is 
tied to the housing supply elasticity  , we experiment with different values of   
to examine the impact of housing supply ( ) on the responses of endogenous 
variables and assert risk premia to the technology shocks.  
2.3. Numerical Analysis 
2.3.1. Calibration  
The model is calibrated to quarterly data and a summary of the parameter 
calibration is provided in Table 2.1. Most of the parameter values are standard in 
the literature. The subjective discount factor   is set to 0.98. Following Lustig et 
al. (2010), I consider the case of intratemporal elasticity of substation less than 
one ( 0.8  ), which suggests that the price elasticity of demand for housing 
service is also less than one. The nonhousing expenditure share is set at 0.8   
                                                 
13
 Dynare is a software platform specialized in solving dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) models. Dynare first finds the deterministic steady states of the nonlinear DSGE model 
starting from initial guesses provided by the user. Once the steady states are found, Dynare will 
check the stability conditions of the model. If the Blanchard-Kahn stability conditions (Blanchard 
et al. (1980)) are satisfied so that there is a unique and stable equilibrium in the neighborhood of 
the deterministic steady state, Dynare uses a pure perturbation approach as in Schmitt-Grohe et al. 
(2004) by default to solve for policy functions and state transition questions of the model. As a 
user-friendly tool, Dynare is not only widely used by various public bodies and private financial 
institutions for performing policy analysis and forecasting, but also popular in economic research 
and teaching.  See Adjemian et al. (2011) and http://www.dynare.org/. For some typical 
applications in the housing/real estate literature, see, e.g., Ghent (2012), Iacoviello et al. (2010), 
Jaccard (2011), and Liu et al. (2013). 
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according to Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2007), who find that the MSA-average of 
the housing expenditure is at 24 percent with little variation. For the degree of risk 
aversion, we set 5   as the low risk aversion benchmark. A high risk aversion 
case with 12   is also investigated to explore the sensitive of the results with 
respect to different degree of risk aversion. The capital share in the production of 
numeraire goods and its depreciation rate are set at 0.33   and 0.025k   (10% 
at annual rate), as in Campbell (1994). For the capital share in the production of 
housing service ( ), I experiment with a range of parameter values from 0.4 to 
0.8, implying a range of housing supply elasticity from 0.67 to 4. These allow us 
to examine how the elasticities of endogenous variables in equation (15) and thus 
how asset risk premia change with the housing supply elasticity. Finally, I 
consider a fairly persistent technology shock 0.95a  . 
Table 2.1 Parameterization 
Parameter  Value 
Preference 
  Subjective time discount factor  0.98 
  Elasticity of intratemporal substitution 0.8 
  Non-housing expenditure share 0.8 
  Constant relative risk aversion 5 and 12 
Technology 
  Capital share in the production of numeraire goods 0.33 
k  Depreciation rate of production capital  0.025 
  Capital share in the production of housing service 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 
Exogenous shock 





2.3.2. Numerical Results 
Table 2.2 presents the numerical results for the elasticity of nonhousing 
consumption ,c , the elasticity of housing consumption ,h , the elasticity of 
return on production capital ,rk , and the elasticity of housing return ,rh  for a 
variety of parameters of the general equilibrium model discussed above
14
.  The 
mean values of the equity risk premium ( erp ) and the housing risk premium ( hrp ) 
calculated according to equation (15) are also reported.  
Table 2.2 Numerical results 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
       ,c   ,h  ,rk  ,rh  hD     
erp  hrp   
5 0.8 4 0.4102 0 0.0423 0.0918 0.0839 0.6275 3.1058 6.7422 
 0.6 1.5 0.4088 0 0.0423 0.1684 0.1557 0.6948 3.0474 12.1424 
 0.4 0.67 0.4083 0 0.0423 0.2573 0.2856 0.8018 2.9931 18.2140 
12 0.8 4 0.4062 0 0.0423 0.0955 0.0839 1.7989 7.1756 16.2089 
 0.6 1.5 0.4040 0 0.0423 0.1769 0.1557 1.9918 7.0006 29.2937 
 0.4 0.67 0.4016 0 0.0423 0.2720 0.2856 2.2985 6.8174 43.8633 
Notes: The table reports, for different combination of risk aversion (γ) and the capital share in the 
production of housing service (φ), the elasticity of nonhousing consumption (𝜂𝑐,𝜖), the elasticity of  
housing consumption (𝜂ℎ,𝜖), the elasticity of equity return (𝜂𝑟𝑘,𝜖), and the elasticity of housing 
return (𝜂𝑟ℎ,𝜖) with respect to shocks,  as well as the mean of equity risk premium (erp) and  the 
mean of housing risk premium (hrp) calculated according to equation (15). 𝜂 denotes the housing 
supply elasticity implied by φ (see equation (21) and  (22)). 𝐷ℎ is the steady state value of the 
price of housing service, and 𝜅  is the steady state value of 𝜅𝑡   in equation (15), which is an 
increasing function of  𝐷ℎ. 
                                                 
14
 In the paper, the housing service is generated by the structure (production capital in the housing 
sector) and the (fixed and one unit of) land attached to it. Therefore, housing as an asset is not 
explicitly modeled as an asset in the paper but its price 𝑃𝑡
ℎ can be understood as the present value 
of the price of housing service and it satisfies 𝑃𝑡
ℎ −  𝐷𝑡
ℎ = 𝐸𝑡(𝑀𝑡+1(1 − 𝛿𝑘) 𝑃𝑡+1
ℎ ). The housing 






ℎ . Return on housing differs from return on 
production capital, which is understood as stock returns in the paper. 
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We can observe from Table 2.2 that, regardless of the degree of risk aversion and 
the housing supply elasticity, all of , ,c h  , ,rk  and ,rh  are positive so that 
the second term in equation (15) is negative
15
. Importantly, the positive sign of 
, ,c h   in the model is not artificial. Consumer theory also suggests that the 
numeraire consumption should be more responsive to shocks such that 
, , 0c h   . To understand this, note that if the relative price of housing, e.g., 
the housing rent, would not change in response to a shock, then a change in total 
consumption expenditure resulting from optimal consumption-saving decision 
after the shock would not alter the relative quantity of consumption goods, so 
, , 0c h    and the second term in equation (15) collapse to zero. However, 
because the housing rent and the asset return are positively correlated, a positive 
sign of the elasticity of asset return implies that the housing rent will increase in 
face of the shock, which in turn will result in a decline in the relative quantity of 
housing consumption due to intratemporal substitution so that , , 0c h   . 
Therefore, both numerical results and the theoretical reasoning suggest that the 
sign of , ,c h   is positive.  
                                                 
15
 Note that by construction, the production capital in the housing sector is predetermined, so the 
elasticity of housing consumption is essentially zero irrespective of the degree of risk aversion and 
the housing supply elasticity. Meanwhile, although the elasticity of nonhousing consumption 
decreases when the housing supply elasticity is low, the effect is almost negligible. This is because 
the price of housing service and thus the price of aggregate consumption is high when the housing 
supply elasticity is low, resulting a smaller consumption quantity adjustment when agents make 
consumption-saving decisions in response to shocks. 
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Because of the positive sign of , ,c h  , the second term in equation (15), which 
is negative, reflects a substitution benefit provided by an asset whose return is 
positively correlated with , ,c h  , and the substation benefit lowers the asset 
risk premium. This can also be understood from the view that when the price of 
housing service is expected to be high or when there is an expected shortfall in 
housing service, an asset whose payoff is denominated by numeraire goods 
possesses lower risk premium because agents are induced to hold this asset for the 
purpose of hedging housing price risk. These results suggest that if a model has 
the shock to nonhousing consumption growth and the shock to its relative quantity 
to housing consumption not independent, such as a production-economy setting 
featuring aggregate productivity shocks we consider here, the “substitution 
benefit” introduced by adding housing to the consumption basket lowers the 
equity risk premium. This is a conclusion in contrast to Piazzesi et al. (2007). 
In addition, although lower housing supply elasticity enhances the substitution 
benefits of an asset, the overall effect depends on how the elasticity of asset return 
changes with the housing supply elasticity. Column (8) and (9) of Table 2.2 
suggest that both the price of housing service hD  and   in the second term of 
equation (15), which is an increasing function of hD , are high when the housing 
supply elasticity is low. As a result, the substitution benefit becomes more 
important in determining asset risk premia. For the production capital, because the 
elasticity of its return is constant (column (6) of Table 2.2), the enhanced 
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substitution effect dominates the consumption risk
16
. Consequently, as shown in 
column (10) of Table 2.2, the equity risk premium decreases when the housing 
supply elasticity is low. On the contrary, because the elasticity of housing return 
with respect to productivity shocks is high when the housing supply elasticity is 
low, a lower housing supply elasticity elevates the consumption risk of housing 
returns
17
; as the elevated consumption risk dominates the substitution benefits, the 
housing risk premium increases when the housing supply elasticity is low, as 
shown in column (11) of Table 2.2. 
2.4. Testable Implications 
2.4.1. Predicting Excess Returns with the Land Value Share of Home 
Value 
The analyses in Section 2.3 suggest that lower housing supply elasticity imply 
lower equity risk premium because of enhanced substitution effect, but it also 
implies higher housing risk premium because of dominated consumption risk. 
Although a time series measure of the housing supply elasticity is hardly 
obtainable, as the model shows that the land value share of housing cost is tied to 
                                                 
16
 The constant elasticity of equity return can be seen from the linear approximation of the equity 




(𝑎𝑡 + (𝛼 − 1)𝑘𝑡−1
𝑏 ) , where the small letters are the log of 
corresponding variables and 𝐾𝑏 and 𝑅𝑘 are the steady state values of corresponding variables. The 
elasticity of the equity return with respect to the productivity is determined by 
𝛼𝐾𝑏
𝑅𝑘
 and not affected 
by risk aversion parameter and the housing supply elasticity. 
17
 This is consistent with Kiyotaki et al. (2011), who argue that the housing price is more sensitive 
to shocks in general productivity growth rates in an economy where the land share of housing 
value is high. 
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the housing supply elasticity, we can test the model predictions using the time 
series data on land value share of home value
18
.  
To see whether the land value share is negatively correlated with the equity risk 
premium and positively correlated with the housing risk premium, I regress the 
excess stock (or housing) returns on the land value share:  
 0 1 1
1
n
t k t t t
k
excessReturn ls Z e  

       (26) 







  is the n-period accumulative 
excess return for stocks or housing, with the excess return being defined as the 
total rate of return of stock or housing minus the prevailing short-term interest 
rate, and the predicting variable is land value share of home value tls . As 
discussed below, tZ  includes a set of variables that have been found useful in 
predicting excess returns in the finance literate. A significant 1  with expected 
sign will lend support to the model implications. I proceed to discuss the data and 
construction of the variables before presenting the empirical results.   
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 Because agents require lower equity risk premium and are induced to hold more equity 
investment when the housing supply elasticity is low, another testable implication is that 
households living in inelastic places should invest more in stocks. Using the geographic variations 
in the housing supply elasticity measured by Saiz (2010) to identify households’ hedging motive 
to hold stocks, Lai et al. (2014) find that the geographic variation in the housing supply elasticity 




I obtain the land value share of home value as the log difference between the 
aggregate market value of residential land and the aggregate market value of 
homes using the quarterly estimates of the price of land and housing used for 
residential purposes in the aggregate U.S. created by Davis and Heathcote 
(2007)
19
. Housing return is defined as (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡)/ 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 , and the 
excess housing return is prepared using the quarterly estimates of housing rents 
and housing price for the aggregate housing stock in the U.S. provided by Davis 
et al. (2008)
20
. The quarterly finance data, including the stock return, risk-free rate 
and other controls included in tZ  are from Welch et al. (2008), who 
comprehensively reexamine the performance of variables that the academic 
literature has suggested to be good predictors of the equity risk premium
21
. 
Depending on the specifications of the linear regression models, the set of 
controls tZ  may include the dividend yield (dy), the market ratio (bm), the net 
                                                 
19
 Davis and Heathcote (2007) constructs both quarterly and annual data on land price and quantity 
based on data on housing values and estimates of structure costs using price indexes for housing 
and construction costs. They first benchmark the house price data on an estimate of the value of 
the stock of housing based on micro data from the 2000 Decennial Census of Housing and 2001 
Residential Finance Survey and then extrapolate the benchmark forwards and backwards using 
either the Macromarkets LLC (formerly Case-Shiller-Weiss) repeat-sales index or the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (formerly Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight) repeat-sales 
index. We use the data constructed with CSW-based price index; using data constructed with 
FHFA-based price index produces similar results in the analyses. The data is available at 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values/price-and-quantity.asp. 
20
 Davis et al. (2008) first use micro data from each of the 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 
Decennial Census of Housing, annual rents paid for rentals units to estimate annual rents for 
owner-occupied units, and then divide these estimated rents by the average (self-reported) value of 
the owner-occupied housing units to produce five benchmark rent-price ratios in each of these 
years. Rent index from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and price indexes from either Case-
Shiller-Weiss (CSW) or OFHEO are used to interpolate between these benchmark years and to 
extrapolate beyond 2000 in order to obtain rent value and average housing price. The data is 
available at https://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values/rent-price-ratio.asp  
21
 The data is available at http://www.hec.unil.ch/agoyal/  
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equity expansion (nits; a measure of corporate issuing activity; see Boudoukh et 
al. (2007)), the term spread (tms, defined as the difference between the long term 
yield on government bonds and the Treasury-bill), the default yield spread (dfy; 
defined as the difference between BAA and AAA-rated corporate bond yields), 
the investment to capital ratio (ik; see Cochrane (1991)) and the regression 
residuals obtained from estimating a long-run cointegration relation among 
consumption, wealth and income (cay; see Lettau et al. (2001)). Given the 
availability of data, the final data used in the analysis spans the period from 
1975Q1 to 2012Q4. 
Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics of the data. According to Table 2.3, the 
mean of excess stock return is roughly the same as the mean of excess housing 
return. However, the first order autocorrelation of (excess) housing returns is 
significant while the counterpart of stock returns is not. These are consistent with 
general perception that stock returns are highly volatile whereas housing returns 
appear to be more persistent. The land value share has is mean of 32.21% with a 
standard deviation of 6.34% over the sample period. Meanwhile, similar to the 
financial variables contained in tZ , the first order autocorrelation of land value 
share is quite high, suggesting that the land value share is highly persistent and 
may have a secular trend. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to believe that the land 
value share is stationary in theory, because if the land value share is a random 
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walk, the probability of staying in a finite range of [0, 1] forever is zero, an 
implication incompatible with the theoretical definition
22
.  
Table 2.3 Summary statistics (1975Q1 - 2012Q4) 
Variable Mean Std Min Max 
1st order 
autocorrelation 
Stock return 0.0539 0.0850 -0.2049 0.2694 0.1095 
Housing return 0.0613 0.0237 -0.0323 0.1231 0.6762 
Risk free rate 0.0129 0.0085 0.0000 0.0387 0.9482 
Excess stock return 0.0409 0.0843 -0.2193 0.2557 0.0842 
Excess housing return 0.0483 0.0222 -0.0341 0.1229 0.6269 
Land value share 0.3221 0.0634 0.1881 0.4827 0.9814 
Dividend yield (dy) 0.0303 0.0135 0.0111 0.0625 0.9739 
Rent price ratio (dp) 0.0474 0.0061 0.0303 0.0562 0.9853 
Book to market ratio (bm) 0.4870 0.2921 0.1252 1.2016 0.9799 
Term spread (tms) 0.0216 0.0150 -0.0350 0.0453 0.7996 
Default yield spread (dfy) 0.0113 0.0048 0.0055 0.0338 0.8493 
Net equity expansion (nits) 0.0081 0.0200 -0.0532 0.0457 0.9199 
Investment to capital ratio (ik) 0.0356 0.0038 0.0274 0.0443 0.9767 
Consumption, wealth and income 
co-integration residual (cay) 
0.0040 0.0216 -0.0432 0.0449 0.9595 
 
As argued by Campbell (2008), the log-linear approximation of dividend price 
ratio proposed in Campbell et al. (1988a, 1988b) suggests that the dividend price 
ratio is a good proxy for risk premium if the dividend growth is not too 
predictable. Because there is little evidence for the predictability of dividend 
growth, we can instead examine the relation between the land value share and 
dividend price ratio to see whether high land value share is associated with low 
                                                 
22
 Piazzesi et al. (2007) apply the same theoretical reasoning to argue for the stationary of 
nonhousing consumption share (although it is highly persistent too). 
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equity risk premium. Therefore, as suggestive evidence, Figure 2.1 plots a time 
series plot of standardized versions of the land value share and the log of dividend 
to price ratio
23
. It is evident from the figure that the two variables are highly 
negatively correlated: When the land value share is above its mean, the dividend 
price ratio is low, suggesting a decline in the equity risk premium; the opposite is 
true when the land value share is below the mean. This provides statistical 
evidence for the model predictions in the theoretical sections.  
Figure 2.1 Standardized land value share and D/P ratio 
 
Notes: This figure plots the time series of land value share and dividend/price ratio of S&P 500 
index. Variables are standardized by subtracting mean and then dividing by standard deviation. 
Data is quarterly from 1975Q1 to 2012Q4. 
 
2.4.3. Empirical Results 
I first run univariate regressions for the excess stock returns for 1,  ,  16n    
quarters. This means that, for each n , I regress the n-period  accumulative excess 
stock return on a constant and the land value share without including any controls 
                                                 
23
 To standardize a viable, we subtract its mean and then divide it by its standard deviation. 














in tZ . The results are presented in Figure 2.2, with coefficients on the left panel 
and the corresponding Newey-West t-statistics for the coefficients on the right 
panel. As can be seen, the coefficients are negative, with the Newey-West t-
statistics well below -2 for all horizons. This suggests that higher land value share 
predicts lower equity risk premium, a result consistent with the model prediction. 
In addition, as n increases from 1 to 16, the coefficients increase too and remain 
significant. While noises may dominate in the short-term return prediction, the 
increasing predictability of the accumulative excess returns implies that the 
information contained in the land value share becomes more important for long-
horizon forecast.  
Figure 2.2 Coefficients and Newey-West t-statistics in univariate excess stock 
return regressions 
 
Notes: This figure shows the coefficients on land value share (𝛽1) and the corresponding Newey-
West t-statistics in univariate regressions for n-period (n=1, …, 16) accumulative excess stock 
returns. The regression model is ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑙𝑠𝑡+𝑒𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑘=1  



























To see whether the land value share is simply a proxy for other predictors that 
have been found useful for predicting equity risk premium, these predictors are 
gradually added into tZ  to have multivariate regressions. Explicitly, I add 
dividend yield (dy) in model 2; in model 3, three more controls are added, 
including market ratio (bm), term spread (tms), default yield spread (dfy); model 4 
includes another two more controls: net equity expansion (ntis) and investment to 
capital ratio (ik); and finally, in addition to all the controls mentioned above, tZ  
in model 5 also includes the cointegration error of consumption, wealth and 
income (cay). As our particular interest is the prediction performance of land 
value share, I first present its coefficient and the corresponding Newey-West t-
statistic for model 2 to model 5 and 1,  ,  16n    in Figure 2.3. 
Although the order of adding controls is somehow arbitrary, we can see that the 
coefficients on the land value share (the left panel of Figure 2.3) are consistently 
negative for all model specifications and all horizons. From the right panel of 
Figure 2.3, we can see that although the coefficients are marginally significant for 
short-horizon forecast, they become significant for long-horizon forecast (e.g., 
when n>6), especially for model 2 and model 4. These results are similar to those 
in the univariate regressions and lend further support to the model implications. 
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Figure 2.3 Coefficients and Newey-West t-statistics in multivariate excess 
stock return regressions 
 
 
Notes: This figure shows the coefficients on land value share (𝛽1) and the corresponding Newey-
West t-statistics in multivariate regressions for n-period (n=1, …, 16) accumulative excess stock 
returns. The regression model is ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑙𝑠𝑡+Φ𝑍𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑘=1 . I 
gradually add controls into 𝑍𝑡 in various models.  In model 2, 𝑍𝑡 includes only dividend yield (dy). 
In model 3, three more controls are added, including market ratio (bm), term spread (tms), default 
yield spread (dfy). In model 4, two more controls, net equity expansion (ntis) and investment to 
capital ratio (ik), are added. Except for all the controls mentioned above,  𝑍𝑡  in model 5 also 
includes the cointegration error of consumption, wealth and income (cay).  
To get a sense of the model specifications and the prediction performance of 
control variables, Table 2.4 reports regression results for a particular 
accumulation period n = 8, with the left panel for the regression results of 
accumulative excess stock returns and the right panel for the regression results of 
accumulative excess housing returns (discussed below). While the coefficients on 
other control variables generally have expected sign, it is worth mentioning that 
the Durbin–Watson (DW) statistics for all model specifications are close to zero, 
indicating that there are serial correlations in the residuals. However, Augmented 
Dicker-Fuller (ADF) tests for a unit root of the residuals are all rejected.  






























































Table 2.4 Predicting accumulative excess returns with land value share (accumulative horizon n=8) 
 
Excess stock returns  Excess housing returns 
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Land value share -1.3088 -1.0531 -1.2322 -0.8224  1.1344 1.0654 1.2098 1.5268 
 (-2.4179) (-1.9464) (-2.4022) (-1.7559)  (2.9174) (3.1013) (3.5200) (5.7797) 
Dividend yield (dy)* 5.0250 12.0767 11.0956 -10.6555  23.0490 22.5881 21.4239 29.8023 
 (1.9547) (2.4970) (2.4340) (-1.9028)  (6.0358) (6.2141) (6.7176) (11.0351) 
Book to market ratio (bm)  -0.2493 -0.2217 0.7469   -0.0325 -0.0319 -0.0965 
  (-1.3320) (-1.1061) (3.0876)   (-0.7017) (-0.8287) (-2.7497) 
Term spread (tms)  3.9796 2.6337 1.4168   2.3715 3.8133 3.6912 
  (2.5270) (1.5125) (1.1195)   (2.7600) (4.3603) (4.2395) 
Default yield spread (dfy)  -3.4599 -5.1932 1.0203   -0.0889 3.6998 2.6665 
  (-0.5978) (-0.7963) (0.2007)   (-0.0410) (1.5645) (1.1736) 
Net equity expansion (nits)   -0.1245 -1.6251    1.0395 0.9241 
   (-0.1020) (-1.8496)    (2.3790) (2.1141) 
Investment to capital ratio (ik)   -9.1938 -7.9251    10.9174 8.1404 
   (-1.0814) (-1.0418)    (3.2676) (2.8479) 
cay    6.7530     -2.0895 
    (5.9933)     (-4.3066) 
Constant 0.5823 0.3588 0.8134 0.7589  -1.0818 -1.0708 -1.5379 -1.8800 
 (2.4698) (1.3324) (2.1078) (2.3313)  (-3.8624) (-4.0846) (-4.7033) (-7.6088) 
Adj-R2 0.3023 0.3942 0.4119 0.5579  0.5173 0.6213 0.7001 0.7575 
N 144 144 144 144  144 144 144 144 
DW 0.3139 0.4883 0.4633 0.3260  0.0481 0.1299 0.3164 0.4206 
Unit root of residual N N N N  N N N N 
Notes: This table shows regression results of accumulative excess stock returns and accumulative excess housing returns on a constant, land value 
share, and other controls included in 𝑍𝑡: ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑙𝑠𝑡+Φ𝑍𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑘=1 , for a particular n=8. In model 2, 𝑍𝑡 includes only 
dividend yield (dy). In model 3, three more controls are added, including market ratio (bm), term spread (tms), default yield spread (dfy). In model 4, 
two more controls, net equity expansion (ntis) and investment to capital ratio (ik), are added. Except for all the controls mentioned above,  𝑍𝑡 in 
model 5 also includes the cointegration error of consumption, wealth and income (cay). We test for a unit root of regression residuals by conducting 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with no lagged difference terms. Newey-West t-statistics are in parentheses.  
*: It is rent price ratio (rp) when dependent variable is the accumulative excess housing returns. 
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I repeat the multivariate regression analyses for the excess housing returns and 
report the results in Figure 2.4, with the results of a particular accumulation 
horizon n=8 presented on the right panel of Table 2.4. In contrast to the results in 
the excess stock return regressions, we can see from the left panel of Figure 2.4 
that the coefficients on the land value share are positive for all model 
specifications and all horizons, suggesting that higher land value share predicts 
higher housing risk premium. This is in line with the model prediction in Section 
2.3. The Newey-West t-statistics on the right panel of Figure 2.4 suggests that the 
performance of the land value share in predicting excess housing returns is better 
for horizons between 2 and 12, a result similar to that in the excess stock returns. 
Again, the Durbin–Watson (DW) statistics and results from Augmented Dicker-
Fuller (ADF) tests for a unit root suggest that the residuals of excess housing 
return regressions are autocorrelated but stationary. 
Overall, the empirical analyses provide evidence in line with the model 
implications: on one hand, when the housing supply elasticity is low, or the land 
value share of home value is high, equity risk premium is low due to the enhanced 
substitution benefits provided by equity investment; on the other hand, lower 
housing supply elasticity implies higher housing risk premium because of 
elevated consumption risk brought by housing investment.   
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Figure 2.4 Coefficients and Newey-West t-statistics in multivariate excess 
housing return regressions 
 
Notes: This figure shows the coefficients on land value share (𝛽1) and the corresponding Newey-
West t-statistics in multivariate regressions for n-period (n=1, …, 16) accumulative excess 
housing returns. The regression model is ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝑙𝑠𝑡+Φ𝑍𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡+1
𝑛
𝑘=1 . I 
gradually add controls into 𝑍𝑡.  In model 2, 𝑍𝑡 includes only dividend yield (dy). In model 3, three 
more controls are added, including market ratio (bm), term spread (tms), default yield spread (dfy). 
In model 4, two more controls, net equity expansion (ntis) and investment to capital ratio (ik), are 
added. Except for all the controls mentioned above,  𝑍𝑡 in model 5 also includes the cointegration 
error of consumption, wealth and income (cay).  
Note that because there is little evidence for the predictability of dividend growth 
and risk-free rate, these results can also be interpreted as followed: low housing 
supply elasticity (or high land value share) predicts low stock returns and high 
housing returns. In addition, note that low housing supply elasticity implies high 
housing price, and given that the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is less 
than one (an assumption we maintain in this paper), the nonhousing consumption 
share is low if the housing supply elasticity is low. This suggests that the 
nonhousing consumption share should positively predict stock returns but 
negatively predict housing returns. Interestingly, empirical results in Kwan et al. 






























(2015) indeed suggest that the coefficients on the nonhousing consumption share 
in predicting stock returns and housing returns have signs that are opposite
24
.     
2.4.4. Discussion on Stationary and Spurious Regressions 
As shown in Table 2.3, the land value share is highly persistent and main contain 
a secular trend. However, because the dependent variables in the empirical 
analyses are not trending, the above results should not be viewed as spurious. The 
stationary of regression residuals shown in Table 2.4 may also suggest that the 
effects of land value share on excess returns are not spurious. On the other hand, 
the presence of persistence could raise the concern that the predictability results 
are biased in small samples. In what follows, I should argue that the biases in the 
results above are small.  
According to Stambaugh (1999), the bias in estimating the coefficient in 
univariate regressions  𝐸(?̂? − 𝛽)  is: 𝑏 × 𝐸(?̂? − 𝜙) , where 𝑏  is the regression 
coefficient of return innovations on innovations to the predictor variable
25
. For the 
excess stock return and the land value share, we estimate b to be equal to 0.4907, 
-0.1662, -1.2412, -4.1681, and -7.0592 at one-, four-, eight-, twelve-, and sixteen-
                                                 
24
 Using data from Hong Kong, Kwan et al. (2015) compares the capacities of eight consumption-
based models in accounting for the asset markets. Specifically, they regress stock returns and 
housing returns on predictors implied by the asset pricing theories that differ in the specifications 
of consumption utility and then compare the prediction errors. Their results in Table 6 and Table 7 
clear show that, for any consumption-based model with housing, the coefficients on nonhousing 
consumption share are positive for stock return predictions but negative for housing return 
predictions. 
25
 To be precise,  Stambaugh (1999) shows that if the return regression is 𝑟𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡+1 
and the AR(1) process for the predictor is 𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝜅 + 𝜙𝑥𝑡 + 𝜐𝑡+1 , the small sample bias is 
𝐸(?̂? − 𝛽) is: 𝑏 × 𝐸(?̂? − 𝜙), where 𝑏 = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑡 , 𝜐𝑡) 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜐𝑡)⁄ .  
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quarter horizon, respectively. In addition, according  to Kendall (1954) and 
Campbell (2008), the downward bias in estimates of 𝜙 is about −(1 + 3𝜙)/𝑇, 
where 𝑇 is the sample size. Give the size of the quarterly sample in the paper 
(𝑇 = 152), the downward bias in estimate of  𝜙 is approximately equal to -0.026. 
Together with the multiple b, we can see that the biases in the slope coefficient 
are about -0.0128, 0.0043, 0.0323, 0.1084, and 0.1835 at one-, four-, eight-, 
twelve-, and sixteen-quarter horizon, respectively. Compared to the coefficients 
shown in Figure 2.2, it is clear that these biases are small.  
2.5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the general equilibrium effect of the housing supply 
elasticity on asset risk premia in a production economy with housing. It is found 
that, in a model where the shock to nonhousing consumption growth and the 
shock to its relative quantity to housing consumption are not independent, such as 
a production-economy setting featuring aggregate productivity shocks in this 
paper, adding housing to the consumption basket introduces a substitution benefit 
that lowers the equity risk premium. In addition, decreasing the housing supply 
elasticity lowers the equity risk premium through the enhanced substitution 
benefit but increase the housing risk premium through the elevated consumption 
risk. Empirical analyses using the land value share of home value as proxy for the 
housing supply elasticity are supportive to these model predictions. In particular, 
the low housing supply elasticity predicts low excess stock returns and higher 
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excess housing returns, especially in the long-horizon (6 – 12 quarters) return 
forecast.   
Overall, these results suggest that (1) understanding the formation of asset risk 
premia in a model with housing requires attentions to both specifications of 
investor preferences and shocks; (2) housing supply conditions would alter the 
asset risk premium and hence have impact on households’ decisions on asset 
allocation; for example, this will help us to understand heterogeneity in the 
households’ portfolio composition in relation to geographic variations in the 
housing supply elasticity (Lai et al. (2014)); (3) the decreasing of the housing 
supply elasticity in general could potentially explain the declining of the equity 
risk premium observed in the U.S. stock market; for the U.S. economy, the equity 
risk premium may stay low if factors such as the increasing concentration of 
population in large cities and increasingly-restricted regulation on home 
development continue to result in inelastic housing supply in general. 
Given the importance of asset risk premia in terms of affecting asset prices, 
decisions on consumption and asset allocation and the fact that the housing supply 
elasticity has not only significant geographic variations but also secular time trend, 
establishing the linkage between the housing supply elasticity and the asset risk 
premium could benefit our understanding about households’ attitude toward risk-
taking and their investment behaviors. This paper takes the first step in this 
direction. However, the current study has several limitations. For example, the 
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current model is constructed to help us to understand the theoretical connection 
between elasticity of housing supply and asset risk premia, and pave the way for 
the empirical study. Our focus on the qualitative properties of the equilibrium 
connection ignores the quantitative properties, e.g., the level of risk premia. In 
addition, the current model did not give any indications of the volatility and the 
cyclicity of the business cycle and housing market cycle. It would be interesting 







                                                 
26
 As an attempt to construct such a model, Appendix B outlines an extended model with growth 
for future research.  
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Chapter 3.  Portfolio Demand and Housing Consumption Risk 
Hedging: Evidence from Geographic Variations in the 
Housing Supply Elasticity 
 
Abstract: Using recent waves of PSID in the US, this paper shows that households 
living in metropolitan areas with less elastic housing supply invest a relatively 
larger fraction of their financial wealth in risky assets (stocks). A model with both 
housing and nonhousing consumption is developed to show that the optimal holding 
of the risky assets could be additionally motivated by households’ hedging 
incentives against unfavorable housing price shocks. Such motive is dependent on 
location and household lifecycle: it is stronger in places with less elastic housing 
supply and for young households on the rising path of their lifecycle housing 
consumption profile. These findings indicate that, besides adjusting homeownership 
choices, households also rely on financial asset as means of hedging against 
housing consumption risk. 
Key words:  housing supply elasticity; portfolio composition; geographic variation 




In developing the intertemporal capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) where 
investors have incentive to hedge against changes in future investment opportunity, 
Merton (1973) points out that in a model with multiple consumption goods “there 
would be systematic effects on the portfolio demands reflecting hedging behavior 
against unfavorable shifts in relative consumption goods prices (i.e., in the 
consumption opportunity set)”. Because Merton (1973) primarily focuses on 
investors’ hedging incentive against investment opportunity and the equilibrium 
relationship among asset yields, he does not explore the hedging incentive against 
unfavorable shifts in relative prices of consumption goods and its effect on portfolio 
choice. In this paper, I apply Merton’s insights by developing a simple two-period-
two-goods model, in which households consume both nonhousing goods and 
housing service, and focus particularly on households’ portfolio choice, e.g., the 
optimal share of savings investing in stocks (risk-asset share).  
I pay particular attention to housing because it is not only a major consumption 
good, but importantly, its price variations are regional so that we could test the 
model implications on the cross-sectional difference in households’ portfolio 
compositions. It is shown that as argued by Merton (1973), in contrast to the single 
consumption good model, the optimal risk-asset share in the two-period-two-goods 
model contains an additional component reflecting households’ incentive to hedge 
against unfavorable housing price risk. Naturally, almost all households are born in 
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“short” position of housing service (Sinai et al. (2005)). In expecting the long 
position of housing in the future, households try to reduce housing price risk by 
buying correlated assets now and selling them in the future when housing is needed. 
This is called “consumption hedge”. Similar to the investment opportunity hedging 
components of risk-asset share in Merton (1973) that move with the covariance 
between asset returns and changes in state variables, it is shown that the 
consumption hedging components of risk-asset share here moves with the 
covariance between housing price and risky stock returns. Because national 
economic shocks will translate mostly into price effect rather than quantity changes 
in areas with less elastic housing supply, the covariance between housing price and 
the national stock market is higher in less elastic areas. Therefore, the model 
predicts that households living in less elastic areas will invest relatively more in 
risky asset as a mechanism of self-insurance against housing price risk. In addition, 
because the hedging incentive also depends on housing consumption profiles, which 
in turn depends in household’s lifecycle, the effect of housing supply elasticity on 
risk-asset share is more pronounced for young households, who are facing steeper 
housing consumption plans.  
Using geographic variations in the housing supply elasticity to account for 
variations in the covariance, this paper provides evidence that lower housing supply 
elasticity encourages more investment in stock shares. With the 2011 wave of the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in combination with regional data and 
Saiz (2010)’s measure of housing supply elasticities in 269 MSAs, it is found that 
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one unit decrease in the housing supply elasticity is associated with 2.4% increase 
in the risk-asset share of household’s financial assets. The result is robust to an 
alternative measure of housing supply elasticities, viz., undevelopable land shares in 
MSAs, which are also estimated by Saiz (2010). The undevelopable land shares are 
generally regarded as exogeneous to regional factors so that it overcomes the 
potential endogeneity problem casued by omitted or unobservable MSA 
characteristics. Because the undevelopable land share is negatively correlated with 
the housng supply elasticity, the result shows that it has significantly positive effect 
on households’ risk shares: 10%  increases in the undevelopable land share are 
corrrelated with 1% increases in the risk-asset share. Given the low risk-asset share 
on average, the marginal effects are not economically insignificant. Consistent with 
the theory, it is also found that the covariance between housing price growth and 
S&P returns has positive effect on risk-asset share. In addition, the results from 
subsample regressions suggest that the risk-asset shares of young households are 
indeed more affected by the local housing supply conditions.  
As a robustness check, I also construct an unbalanced short panel using 2001, 2005, 
and 2009 waves of the PSID and run pool cross-section regressions with MSA × 
year dummies. The time variation of the housing supply elasticity in the panel 
overcomes the potential self-selection problem in the cross-section regressions that 
less risk-averse households would self-select into big MSAs which generally have 
low housing supply elasticities. In addition, the MSA × year dummies control for 
any MSA and year effects so that the endogeneity problem caused by omitted or 
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unobservable MSA characteristics is absent in the pool regressions. However, 
because of the MSA × year dummies, we cannot identify pure MSA level factors 
such as the housing supply elasticity. Therefore, I instead focus on lifecycle 
implications of the effect of housing supply elasticities on the risk-asset share of 
young households using the panel. As expected, it is found that, due to the housing 
consumption hedging incentive, young households living in less elastic MSAs are 
induced to hold relatively higher risk-asset shares. This is consistent with results 
using 2011 wave of the PSID. In addition, the differences in risk-asset shares of 
young households in MSAs with elastic and inelastic housing supply decreases with 
the cut-off age that defines young households, as the theory predicts that the 
difference for young households who have steepest housing consumption profiles 
should be the largest.  
The present paper first contributes to the literature by showing that the cross-
sectional differences in households’ portfolio compositions can be explained by the 
hedge incentive against housing price risk, which is dependent on location and 
household lifecycle. These findings echo Merton (1973)’s view on portfolio 
demand for consumption hedging. In addition, by connecting the households’ asset 
allocation choice to the housing supply elasticity, this paper contributes to the 
growing literature that brings finance and urban economics together (e.g., Ortalo-
Magne et al. (2010)). The  findings  in this paper suggest  a  promising  demand  for  
financial  products  to hedge  housing  consumption  risk,  such  as  futures  
contracts  linked  to  regional  housing price  indexes (Case et al. (1993)). Such 
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demand is likely to increase as population becomes more concentrated in larger and 
denser metropolitan areas, where the housing supply elasticity tends to be lower.  
The paper proceeds as follow: Section 3.2 is a brief review on related papers. 
Section 3.3 presents a simple two-period-two-goods model to motivate the 
empirical study. Section 3.4 contains discussion about data and variable 
construction, empirical model and results, and robustness check. Finally, Section 
3.5 concludes.   
3.2. Related Literature  
The paper first closely relates to the growing literature that aims to understand the 
households’ hedging incentive against housing consumption risk and the subsequent 
consequences on homeownership, housing price, housing consumption, and the 
risk-return relationship for housing etc. For example, Sinai et al. (2005) show that 
the incentive to hedge housing price risk by owning a house makes the probability 
to own and the price-to-rent ratio higher in markets with more volatile housing rent; 
Han (2008, 2010) find that stronger hedging incentives (e.g., steeper future housing 
consumption plans) induce larger housing demand (e.g., size of housing), ceteris 
paribus. In addition, Han (2013) shows that the hedging incentive to own helps to 
explain the negative risk-return relationship for housing observed in some MSAs in 
US. In a spatial equilibrium setting, Ortalo-Magne et al. (2010) demonstrates that 
the hedge demand depends on the covariance between the agents’ earnings and 
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local equilibrium rents, and has consequences on location choice and investment in 
local real estate.  
By taking particular focuses on households’ asset allocation, the present paper 
complements the aforementioned studies by showing that households not only rely 
on owning more housing asset as a way to hedge against housing price risk, they are 
also trying to further eliminate housing price risk by investing in national stocks. 
They especially do so if the local housing supply is less elastic so that the housing 
price has higher correlation with risky stock returns, and if they are young 
households so that they expect larger housing consumption in the future. In fact, 
because of high housing prices in a place with inelastic housing supply, 
consumption hedging with excess housing investment is costly and would not be 
effective. 
To some extent, this research also shares some similarities with papers studying the 
role of nontradable goods in an open economy in explaining the “home bias”, which 
documents the concentration of domestic assets in the portfolios held by domestic 
investors despite the apparent diversification gains to be had from holding foreign 
asset. Several papers show that the bias arise as households try to hedge the 
fluctuations in their consumption of nontraded goods (Baxter et al. (1998), Eldor et 
al. (1988), Hnatkovska (2010), and Tesar (1993)). Although this research 
investigates geographic variation of household’s portfolio across regions within a 
country, it is clear that the local housing service that play crucial role in the current 
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study is comparable to the nontraded goods in an open economy. I show that 
consumption hedging incentive depends importantly on the supply elasticity of the 
nontraded good. 
The viewpoint of allocating investment in assets of which returns are correlated 
with housing price as means of hedging housing risk is not new in the portfolio 
choice literature that considers housing. In constructing the consumption-based 
capital asset pricing model with housing and housing transaction cost, Flavin et al. 
(2008) has pointed out that if the covariance matrix of risky asset and housing 
prices is not block diagonal, risky financial assets would be used to hedge the risk 
associated with current and future housing price. However, the same as Merton 
(1973), Flavin et al. (2008) focus not on portfolio choice but on the Euler equation 
of the housing CCAPM and they assume zero covariance between housing price 
and stocks. Englund et al. (2002), Iacoviello et al. (2003), and Quigley (2006) 
examine hedging housing risk in a mean-variance framework by allowing positions 
in real estate stocks, and housing price derivative instruments, but because they 
treat housing risk purely from the investment perspective and ignores future 
housing consumption needs, the consumption hedge incentive is absent in their 
model. This paper differs from this line of research by treating housing as a 
consumption good, and exploring the effect of geographic variation in the 
covariance matrix between regional housing prices and national stock returns on 
household portfolio composition choice. By focusing on cross-sectional variations 
in asset allocation, the present study extends the growing literature that examines 
60 
 
the lifecycle portfolio compositions with housing (e.g., Cocco (2004), Fischer et al. 
(2013), Hu (2005), and Yao et al. (2005)). 
Finally, it is widely recognized that the housing supply elasticity varies 
substantially across regions that are due to either differences in either physical and 
geographical constraints or regulatory practices (Glaeser et al. (2008), Green et al. 
(2005), Ortalo-Magné et al. (2011), Quigley et al. (2005), and Saiz (2010)), and that 
the price elasticity of housing supply play important role in affecting housing price 
level, volatility, persistence of housing market cycles, and urban form (Ferreira et al. 
(2011) , Fu et al. (2010), Glaeser et al. (2006), Glaeser et al. (2008), Huang et al. 
(2012), and Paciorek (2013)). Because the volatility and boom-bust cycles of 
housing market crucially depend on the local housing supply elasticity (Ferreira et 
al. (2011), Glaeser et al. (2008), Huang et al. (2012), and Paciorek (2013) ), the 
covariance between housing price shock and national stock market returns, and 
hence the households’ portfolio composition, also depend on housing supply 
elasticity. However, little research has been undertaken to understand the 
implications of local housing supply elasticity for household’s asset allocation 
choice. The present study fills the gap by establishing the link between geographic 
variation in the housing supply elasticity and households’ asset allocation.  
3.3. Conceptual Framework 
This section presents a conceptual framework to motivate the empirical study in this 
paper. A simple two-period-two-goods model is developed to show how the 
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housing supply elasticity affects the optimal holding of risky assets. It is shown that 
unlike the single consumption good model, the optimal holding of risky assets is 
additionally motivated by households’ hedging incentives against unfavorable 
housing price shocks.  
Let time be discrete and consider a household living for two periods
27
. Assume the 
household has saving S  at time t  measured after consumption. At time 1t  , the 
household consumes all his/her wealth which include gross return on investment 
and his/her labor income. Therefore, in order to maximize the time 1t   
consumption utility, the household optimally allocates the saving S  to two financial 
securities that are available to him/her: a risky asset (stocks) with gross return 1
s
tR   
and a risk-free asset (Treasury bills) with constant gross return fR . Assume the 
return on stocks is log-normal with mean sr  and variance 
2
s :  
   21 1ln ~ ( , )s s st t sr R N r     (27) 
Because we are interest in households’ hedging incentives against the risk of 
relative consumption goods prices, assume households consume both nonhousing 
(numeraire) good 1tC    and housing service 1tH   at time 1t   and have CRRA 
preferences: 
                                                 
27
 A two-period model is simple to handle, and importantly, sufficient for the purpose of this study. 
Fama (1970) has noted that as long as the preference and the investment opportunity sets are 
invariant with state and time, the intertemporal portfolio choice problem of infinite horizon or 
multiple periods can be treated as if the households have single period utility function. The model 





















  (28) 
where 0 1   and 0   represent the consumption share of nonhousing goods 
and relative risk aversion, respectively. Without loss of generality, households are 
assumed to obtain housing service from rental market at price 1
h
tP  (housing rent), 
which is also log-normal
28
: 
   21 1ln ~ ( , )h h ht t hp P N p     (29) 
where  sp  and 
2
h  are the mean and variance of housing rent. The housing rent 
1
h
tp   and the risky return 1
s
tr   are not independent of each other, but have 
contemporaneous covariance sh . As will be shown below, the covariance between 
the housing rent and the risky return is critical for understanding the regional 
difference in households’ asset allocations.  
Let   be the proportion of saving invest in stocks over stocks plus bills, and 
 11p s f fttR R R R      the return on investment portfolio at time 1t  . 
                                                 
28
 Because housing price is the capitalization of housing rent, assuming households own housing 
rather than renting will not alter the theoretical results of the paper but render the model less 
tractable. For simplicity, we assume households in the model are housing renters. In addition, the 
distributional assumption of 
h
tP  is not critical. We assume log-normal distribution because it allows 
us to obtain analytical solution of optimal risk-asset share later. When analytical solutions are not 
practical, we will assume the price of housing service (housing rent) follows gamma distribution, as 
suggested by empirical evidences. 
63 
 
Following Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997), denote the sum of gross return on 
investment 1
p
tR   and labor income 1tY   by cash-on-hand at time 1t  : 11
p
ttR S Y   . 
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  (30) 
According to  (28) and (30) , we can have the household’s indirect utility function: 
 
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  (31) 
Equation (31) clearly shows that the optimal risk-asset share *  depends on the 
joint distribution of risky return 1
s
tR  , the income to saving ratio 1tY S , and the 
housing rent 1
h
tP . Because of the power of summation in the conditional 
expectation, we are not able to obtain analytical solution for *  with the 
distributional assumptions given above. To obtain analytical solution for a better 
understanding, first ignore labor income and assume 1 0tY    for certain. The 
assumption of zero labor income will be relaxed, and *  will be solved numerically 
to examine how the results are sensitive to assumptions about labor income risk.  
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3.3.1. Assume No Labor Income (𝑬𝒕[𝒀𝒕+𝟏] = 𝟎, 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒕[𝒀𝒕+𝟏] = 𝟎) 
If 1 0tY   for certain, the indirect utility function  can be simplified as: 
 
              
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tr   is the log of the portfolio return:  1 1lnp pt tr R  . According to the 
approximation method in Campbell et al. (2001), the log of portfolio return 1
p
tr  can 
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r r    

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   
    (33) 
Equation  (33) gives us a clear understanding about the determinants of optimal 
risk-asset share in a model with two consumption goods. The first term in  is the 
risk-asset share in a model without housing consumption. As expected, it increases 




sr r    but decrease with risk aversion   and 
variance of stock returns 
2
s .  The second term is of our primary interest. It shows 
that as long as the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is not too high 
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( 1  )29, the optimal risk-asset share increases with the covariance between the 
housing rent 1
h
tp   and the risky return 1
s












  (34) 
A simple calibration with 0.8  , 5   and 2 20.16s   suggests that the marginal 
effect of 10 basis points increase in sh on the optimal risk-asset share is 0.625%. 
As we will discuss in Section 3.4, the mean risk-asset share of the U.S. households’ 
portfolio is relatively low and the standard deviation of sh  during 1992-2012 
across MSAs is 26 basis points, so the marginal effect is not economically 
unimportant.  





. Because demand shocks will mostly translate into price effects rather than 
quantity effect in less elastic areas, the covariance between housing price and stock 






. This is consistent with 
                                                 
29
 The existing studies on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution generally support that EIS<1, 
implying γ>1. For instance, Havránek et al. (2013) collect 2,735 estimates of the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution in consumption from 169 published studies that cover 104 countries, and 
find the mean reported estimates of EIS is 0.5. Among the six countries that they have more than 50 
estimates, Havránek et al. (2013) find the second largest EIS (0.6) for the US, following the largest 
EIS (0.9) for Japan. The mean reported estimate of EIS for the US is also close to the baseline 
calibration of 2/3 used by Smets et al. (2007). 
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the simulation results in Leung et al. (2011), who construct a multi-region general 
equilibrium model and show numerically that the correlation between the regional 
house price and the contemporary period stock price is singnificantly higher in 
region with higher housing stock adjustment costs. The negative correlation 
between housing supply elasticity and the covariance between housing price and 
stock returns also has empirical support, as we will see in the next section where I 
discuss the data. Therefore, we have: 
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 in  (35) provide the basis for the main tests in the 
paper. 
Although the optimal risk-asset shares in (34) and (35) do not depend on housing 
consumption 1tH   in the simple two-period model,  the negative effect of the 
housing supply elasticity on risk-asset share due to housing consumption hedging 
should be more pronounced for young households, who are more likely to trade up 
to a bigger home and hence have stronger hedge incentives. This lifecycle 
implication will be tested in the empirical analysis too.  
We abstract from labor income in the above discussion. If the labor income is 
riskless, and is high in less elastic areas as suggested by spatial equilibrium model, 
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households will have a higher risk-asset share because of the substitutability of 
labor income for bills (Bodie et al. (1992)). This is still the case even the labor 
income has idiosyncratic risk (Viceira (2001)). Therefore, the effect of housing 
supply elasticity on risk-asset share through the consumption hedging incentives 
will be confounded by the substitution effect. However, because the real labor 
income normalized by housing price is not necessarily higher in less elastic areas, 
omitting the substitution effect may not seriously bias the estimation of hedging 
effect. Nonetheless, household family income is controlled in the empirical models 
in order to take into account the possible substitution effect.    
Abstracting from labor income will be more problematic if the labor income shocks 
contain region-specific components so that the covariance between the labor 
income shock and unexpected stock returns are systematically different across 
regions. For example, it is likely that regions may respond differently to nationwide 
forces, such as monetary and fiscal policies, changes in relative price of energy, and 
technological innovations. Difference in industrial mixes may also contribute to 
regional labor income cycles. As shown in Viceira (2001), whenever the return on 
risky asset is positively (negatively) correlated with labor income, the optimal risk-
asset share contains a nonzero component representing negative (positive) hedging 
demand for stocks. Therefore, if the regional labor income shock has specific 
covariance with the national stock returns, it systematically affects households’ 
asset allocation in that region.  
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However, there is little empirical evidence on whether and to what extent the labor 
income differs across regions, let alone how the differences are correlated with the 
housing supply elasticity. To examine the sensitiveness of the model prediction to 
the abstraction of labor income risk, we next assume risky nonzero income and 
experiment with various assumptions on the joint distribution of risky return 1
s
tR  , 
the income to saving ratio 1tY S , and the housing rent 1
h
tP .  
3.3.2. Assume Risky Nonzero Labor Income (𝑬𝒕[𝒀𝒕+𝟏] ≠ 𝟎, 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒕[𝒀𝒕+𝟏] ≠ 𝟎) 
The housing supply elasticity   could not only affect the covariance between 
housing rent and stock return sh , but also have impact on the covariance between 
labor income and stock return sy , and  the covariance between labor income and 
housing rent 
yh . Without clear theoretical and empirical guidance on the 
calibrations of the changes of sy  and yh  with respect to   relative to changes of 








.  This is an extreme assumption about how the joint 
distribution of risky return, labor income, and housing rent are affected by  .  
With the above assumption, we can solve for the optimal risk-asset share 
numerically. As before, we set 0.8  , 5   and 2 20.16s  . The expected risky 
return sr  and return on risk-free asset are set to be 0.08sr  , 0.03fr  , 
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respectively.  In addition, assume the housing rent 
1
h
tP and the labor income 
normalized by saving 1tY S  follow gamma distributions. To obtain the shape and 




and 1tY S . Using the 2011 wave of PSID, I find the cross-sectional mean and 




and income to total wealth ratio 1tY S  
are 
39.05hP  , 2 701.74hP  , 8.36YS  , and 
2 6608.90YS  , respectively
30
. These 
imply the shape and scale parameters of the gamma distributions being 2.13hP  , 
17.97hP  , 0.01YS  , and 709.54YS  . With these parameters at hand, I then 
increase the Spearman’s rank correlation between the housing rent and stock returns 
 1 1,s ht tR P    from 0 to 1 that can be considered as being caused by the decreases in 
the housing supply elasticity, and at the same time set the Spearman’s rank 
correlation between the housing rent and the normalized labor income 
 1 1,ht tP Y S    and the Spearman’s rank correlation between the stock return and 
the normalized labor income  1 1,st tR Y S    being the same as   1 1,s ht tR P    so that 
all of them increase in the same pace
31
.  For a given set of the Spearman’s rank 
correlations, I first translate them into Pearson’s correlation, and then simulate 
correlated multivariate normal random variables 10
6
 times. These random variables 
                                                 
30
 The housing rent is deflated by CPI-U 2010 average (1982-84=100), and the income to total 
wealth ratio are restricted to samples with positive income and total wealth. Although the cross-
sectional distribution may be poor estimate of the distribution of time series data, which are our 
interest here, the exact shape and scale parameters of the distributions are not critical in the 
numerical exercise because what matter are the correlations among the time series, which we set 
exogenously in order to examine the sensitiveness of the results to the changes in correlations. 
31
 Because we fix the variance of the variables, the covariances are determined by the correlations. 
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are transformed to follow log normal distribution (
1
s




tP  and 1tY S )  before calculating the expectation in equation (31). Finally, the 




Figure 3.1 depicts how the optimal risk-asset share *  changes as  1 1,s ht tR P    
increases from 0 to 1. Note that in this figure,  1 1,st tR Y S    and  1 1,ht tP Y S    
increase in the same pace as  1 1,s ht tR P    increases. As can be seen, the optimal 
risk-asset share *  still increases with the  1 1,s ht tR P    even under the extreme 
assumption that  1 1,ht tP Y S    and  1 1,s ht tR P    increase simultaneously. This is 
consistent with the prediction of the simple model without labor income or with 
riskless labor income.  
                                                 
32
 Matlab code for numerically solving the optimal risk-asset share is available upon request. 
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Figure 3.1 Optimal risk-asset share when labor income is risky 
 
Notes: The figure shows how the optimal risk-asset share moves with the correlation between the 
housing price changes and risky returns when labor income is risky. We solve for the optimal risk-
asset share 𝜶∗ in equation  for 𝝆(𝑹𝒕+𝟏
𝒔 , 𝑷𝒕+𝟏
𝒉 ) increasing from 0 to 1, with 𝝆(𝑷𝒕+𝟏
𝒉 , 𝒀𝒕+𝟏 𝑺⁄ ) and 
𝝆(𝑹𝒕+𝟏
𝒔 , 𝒀𝒕+𝟏 𝑺⁄ )  increase simultaneously. For each set of correlations, we search for 
*  that 
maximizes the conditional expectation in equation (31), which is evaluated as the mean of 10
6
 
simulations. In the simulation of random variable, 𝑹𝒕+𝟏
𝒔  follows log normal distribution 𝒓𝒕+𝟏
𝒔 =
𝐥𝐧(𝑹𝒕+𝟏
𝒔 ) ~𝑵(𝟎. 𝟎𝟖, 𝟎. 𝟏𝟔𝟐), while 𝑷𝒕+𝟏
𝒉  and 𝒀𝒕+𝟏 𝑺⁄  follow gamma distribution with parameters 
2.13hP  , 17.97hP  , 0.01YS  , and 709.54YS  .   
 
Overall, the simple two-period-two-goods model in this section suggests that, for 
the purpose of hedging housing price risk, the positive covariance between housing 
price growth and risky returns induce households to have higher demand for risky 
assets. Because the covariance depends on local housing supply elasticity, the 
model predicts households living in areas with less elastic housing supply should 
invest a relatively larger fraction of their financial wealth in risky assets. In addition, 
because housing consumption demand depends on lifecycle, the effect of housing 

































supply elasticity on risk-asset share should be more pronounced for young 




3.4. Empirical Evidence 
3.4.1. Data and Variable Construction 
To test the implications of the model, various sources of data on both household and 
MSA levels are used. Household level risk-asset shares are extracted from recent 
waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
 34
. They are the dependent 
variable in the empirical analyses. To test equation (35), I use the housing supply 
elasticities in MSAs estimated by Saiz (2010) as explanatory variable
35
. Saiz (2010) 
also provides the undevelopable land shares in MSAs. Because of its exogeneity, 
the undevelopable land shares have advantage of being less likely correlated with 
omitted regional factors. Therefore, I also use them as a proxy for housing supply 
                                                 
33
 The discussions above about demand for risky asset for hedging housing price risk seem to be 
most relevant to positive housing price shocks. Some may concern that negative shocks and the 
kinked function of housing supply that is elastic w.r.t. positive shocks but inelastic w.r.t. downward 
shocks could invalidate the predictions. Admittedly, the hedging incentive may be absent if 
households expect negative housing price shocks so that the housing supply elasticity would not 
have impact on portfolio choice. However, positive shocks are dominant in the housing market so 
the housing supply elasticity takes effect. In addition, since it can be shown that the volatility of 
housing price is proportional to demand volatility even when housing development is irreversible 
Guthrie (2010), the kinked housing supply does not necessarily mean asymmetric housing price risk. 
Therefore, as long as upside risk dominates, the model predictions still hold with kinked housing 
supply.     
34
 PSID data are public available at http://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/. However, “PSID-Geocode 
Match Files” that identify the location (e.g., MSAs) where respondents live are restricted. Some of 
the data used in this analysis are derived from Restricted Data Files of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, obtained under special contractual arrangements designed to protect the anonymity of 
respondents. These data are not available from the authors. Persons interested in obtaining PSID 
Restricted Data Files should contact through the Internet at PSIDHelp@isr.umich.edu.  
35
 I thank Albert Saiz for sharing his data. 
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elasticities. In addition, I construct the covariance between housing price growth 
and S&P returns in MSAs, and test directly its effect on risk-asset shares in 
accordance to equation (34). The definition of variables and the data sources are 
discussed in details below.  
Risk-asset share and other household characteristics: Starting at the household 
level, the risk-asset share and other household characteristics are obtained from the 
PSID. The PSID contains rich household level information about asset holdings and 
many other household characteristics including age, gender, education, family 
income, and so on. Following the common practice in empirical literature, I define 
risk free savings as the sum of cash, checking and savings, bond and insurance, and 
refer the risky assets as the sum of holdings of stocks and mutual funds. The risk-
asset share is extracted from the PSID as the ratio of risky assets to financial assets, 
which is the sum of the risky assets and risk free savings.  
Although the PSID is a longitudinal study that tracks households and their 
descendants over time, I focus on the most recent wave of the PSID for the year of 
2011 in the empirical analysis. This is not only because our primary focuses are on 
the cross-sectional variation of households’ risk-asset shares, but also because we 
lack reliable time-series measure of housing supply elasticities. While Saiz (2010)’s 
measure of housing supply elasticities are widely used in the literature (see e.g., 
Huang et al. (2012), Mian et al. (2011) , and Paciorek (2013)),  they are cross-
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sectional. As a result, I choose the 2011 wave of PSID because the year of survey is 
closer to the year in which Saiz (2010) estimate the MSA housing supply elasticities.  
As a robustness check of the results from the 2011 wave of PSID, I also use the 
2001, 2005 and 2009 waves of PSID to construct alternative samples of unbalanced 
short panel and run pool cross-section regressions
36
. The data structure of 
unbalanced short panel has the advantage of allowing us to add MSA × year 
dummies in the empirical model. These dummies help to control for unobservable 
MSA characteristics and year effects at the expense of not identifying pure MSA 
level factors such as housing supply elasticity. Therefore, I will focus the lifecycle 
implications of the model in the pool cross-section regressions by comparing young 
households’ portfolio composition across MSAs. More about the robustness check 
with alternative waves of the PSID will be discussed in Section 3.4.3. 
Housing supply elasticity and undevelopable land share: At the MSA level, we rely 
on the housing supply elasticities in MSAs estimated by Saiz (2010). Using the 
satellite-generated data, Saiz (2010) computes the undevelopable land shares in 
MSAs, which are the percentage of land within a 50-km radius from the 
metropolitan central cities that are unsuitable for housing development because of 
water bodies, wetlands, and steep slopes. Saiz (2010) then provides estimates of 
housing supply elasticity measure as functions of both physical and regulatory 
                                                 
36
 Again, we do not use all the consecutive biennial waves of PSID from 2001 to 2009 in 
constructing the panel because we are more interested in cross-sectional variation. In addition, 
because there is little time-variation in the housing supply elasticity within short periods, using all 
consecutive waves of the PSID adds little value for testing cross-sectional differences. 
75 
 
constraints for 269 major metropolitan areas in the U.S. It ranges from 0.60 to 12.15, 
with smaller value indicating lower housing supply elasticity.  
Because the housing supply elasticities are considered to be endogenous to 
population growth and other MSA economic factors, the empirical results can be 
biased if there are omitted and unobservable MSA characteristics that are correlated 
with both of housing supply elasticity and households’ investment behavior. In 
contrast, the undevelopable land share, as an argument of the housing supply 
elasticity function, is generally regarded as purely exogenous to most regional 
economic factors. The exogeneity of the undevelopable land share is useful for 
dealing with the potential endogeneity problem caused by omitted and unobservable 
MSA characteristics. Therefore, the undevelopable land shares are also used as a 
proxy for housing supply elasticities in the cross-section regressions. Clearly, the 
undevelopable land shares in MSAs are negatively correlated with the housing 
supply elasticity, as argued by Saiz (2010).    
Covariance between housing price growth and risky returns: I construct the 
covariances between housing price growth in MSAs and the S&P 500 returns so 
that we can examine their correlation with the housing supply elasticities and 
undevelopable land shares, as well as directly test their effect on households’ risk-
asset shares. As shown in the conceptual framework, it is the negative correlation 
with the covariance between housing price growth and risky returns through which 
the housing supply elasticity affects risk-asset share. We want to see whether the 
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negative correlation exists in the data. To construct the covariances, the quarterly 
Federal Housing Finance Agency Purchase-Only Indexes in 100 largest MSAs 
spanning 1991Q1-2014Q2 (hereafter the FHFA indexes) are used. I define the 
yearly housing price growth in MSAs as the log difference of the 4
th
 quarter FHFA 
indexes. Data on S&P composition price and dividend from Rober Shiller’s website 
are used to measure stock returns. For each MSA, I use the yearly housing price 
growth and stock returns from 1992 to 2013 to calculate the covariance between 
housing price growth and S&P 500 returns.  
Other MSA economic variables: To control for other regional factors, I obtain local 
unemployment rates by MSA from Bureau of Labor Statistics, population by MSA 
from U.S. Census Bureau, and GDP by MSA from Bureau of Economic Analysis. I 
will use the average unemployment rate, the average population growth, and the 
average GDP growth in MSAs from 2007 to 2011 as controls for regional factors. 
Using the 2011 PSID, I also calculate mean of risk free savings to wealth ratio for 
households whose family income is below the 5% percentile of the empirical family 
income distribution in each MSA, and use it to control for the potential regional 
difference in the social security network.  
As discussed in the conceptual framework section, regional-specific income risks 
may correlate with housing supply elasticities and affect households’ portfolio 





. In the cross-section regressions, I follow Carlino et al. (2001) 
and use the standard deviation of real per capita income from 2008 to 2012 by MSA 
as control for potential regional difference in labor income risk
38
. In the robustness 
check with alternative samples, the MSA × year dummies in the pool cross-section 
regressions are able to control for MSA characteristics including labor income risks.    
With the aforementioned datasets at hand, I then merge the MSA level data with the 
PSID using location identifier in PSID-Geocode Match Files. Because the risk-asset 
share is not defined for households with zero financial assets, I restrict the sample to 
households with positive financial asset. I also transform some household control 
variables to minimize the effect of outliers. For example, I divide household yearly 
income and total wealth by the sample mean in order to reduce their magnitude, and 
I take the log of household mortgage payment after adding a small number (0.01). 
In addition, I multiply the covariance by 10,000 so that its unit is basis point. Other 
household controls such as education, gender, marital status, occupation, race, 
health status, and family composition change are dummy or category variables and 
are left as they are. After steps of merging and cleaning the data, the final usable 
                                                 
37
 Most studies about the effect of labor income risk on portfolio choice are theoretical and rely on 
numerical simulation (see e.g., Bodie et al. (1992), Viceira (2001), and Polkovnichenko (2007)). 
Some empirical analyses rely on rely on self-reported indicators of income risk (e.g., Guiso et al. 
(1996)). 
38
 Although nominal per capita income by MSA is available since 1969, the real per capita income 
by MSA that is adjusted by regional price parities (RPP) is only recently available from  2008 to 
2012 at www.bea.gov/regional/index.htm  
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Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of the combined data. In the table, I define 
MSAs with inelastic housing supply as those with housing supply elasticities lower 
than 25% percentile of the empirical distribution, and otherwise elastic MSAs. As 
can be see, the mean of risk-asset share in MSAs with inelastic housing supply is 
0.20. It is relative higher than the mean of risk-asset share in elastic MSAs, which is 
0.17. We can also observe from Table 3.1 that the undevelopable land share and the 
covariance between housing price growth and S&P stock returns are negatively 
correlated with the housing supply elasticity: In MSAs with inelastic housing 
supply, the means of the undevelopable land share and the covariance are both 
much higher. This relation is more evident in Table 3.2, which presents the 
correlation matrix of these three variables. It suggests that the price growths indeed 
have higher covariance with the national stock returns in less elstic MSAs, 
consistent with the implications of the two-region general equilibrium model in 
Leung et al. (2011). Importantly, this lends support to the conjecture in the 
conceptural framework because the negative correlation between the housing 
supply elasticity and the covariance between housing price growth and risky returns 
are critical for the effect of housing supply elasticity on the hedging demand for 
stocks to operate.  
                                                 
39
 However, the exact sample size will vary with the specifications of empirical model. 
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics 
 All samples Samples in elastic MSAs Samples in inelastic MSAs 
 N Mean Std Dev  N Mean Std Dev  N Mean Std Dev 
Panel A: Summary statistics of household variables (2011 PSID) 
risk-asset share 4,799 0.18 0.31 3,159 0.17 0.3 1,640 0.2 0.32 
age 4,799 46.21 16.56 3,159 45.71 16.43 1,640 47.17 16.79 
occupation 4,781 9.08 6.16 3,150 9.04 6.15 1,631 9.17 6.18 
health status 4,781 2.39 1 3,148 2.39 1 1,633 2.38 1.01 
college degree 4,799 0.43 0.5 3,159 0.43 0.5 1,640 0.44 0.5 
family size 4,799 2.57 1.41 3,159 2.61 1.43 1,640 2.48 1.38 
gender (1=male, 2=female) 4,799 1.27 0.45 3,159 1.27 0.44 1,640 1.28 0.45 
married 4,799 0.61 0.49 3,159 0.62 0.49 1,640 0.6 0.49 
race 4,764 1.51 1.1 3,132 1.47 1.02 1,632 1.58 1.24 
mortgage payment (log) 4,755 4.41 4.75 3,126 4.52 4.74 1,629 4.18 4.77 
income 4,799 1.3 1.55 3,159 1.3 1.64 1,640 1.31 1.35 
total wealth 4,799 1.48 5.59 3,159 1.51 6.05 1,640 1.42 4.56 
family composition change  4,799 0.88 1.71 3,159 0.93 1.76 1,640 0.79 1.58 
Panel B: Summary statistics of MSA variables       
housing supply elasticity (Saiz (2010)) 205 2.5 1.45 154 2.96 1.38 51 1.09 0.27 
undevelopable land share (Saiz (2010)) 205 0.26 0.21 154 0.17 0.13 51 0.53 0.17 
cov(housing price growth, S&P returns) 60 26.98 25.99 41 20.2 21.41 19 41.61 29.4 
mean risk free savings of low income households 256 0 6.26 209 0.41 0.8 47 -1.82 14.49 
average unemployment rate (2007-2011) 258 6.65 1.78 207 6.57 1.89 51 6.96 1.21 
average population growth (2007-2011) 282 0.01 0.02 232 0.01 0.02 50 0.01 0.01 
average GDP growth (2007-2011) 271 0.51 1.85 221 0.67 1.78 50 -0.2 1.97 
s.d. of real per capita income (2008-2012) 271 0.11 0.06 221 0.1 0.06 50 0.11 0.06 
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics of the combined data using 2011 wave of PSID and MSA level datasets. For the 2011 PSID, the sample is 
restricted to those with positive financial asset. The housing supply elasticities and the undevelopable land shares in MSAs are obtained from Saiz (2010). 
MSAs are defined as elastic (inelastic) if housing supply elasticities are below (above) the 25% percentile of the empirical distribution. Occupation, health 
status, college degree, male, married, race are all dummy or category variables with respect to household head. A small number (0.01) is added to mortgage 
payment before taking log. Income and total wealth are relative measures in the sense that they have been divided by sample means. FHFA Purchase-Only 
Indexes are used for obtaining housing price growth in MSAs. Covariances between housing price growth and S&P returns are calculated using time series 
from 1992 to 2012. 
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Table 3.2 Correlation matrix 





growth, S&P returns) 
housing supply 



















Notes: The table shows the pairwise correlations between variables at the MSA level. The 
housing supply elasticity and undevelopable land share are obtained from Saiz (2010). FHFA 
Purchase-Only Indexes are used for obtaining housing price growth in MSAs. Covariances 
between housing price growth and S&P returns are calculated using time series from 1992 to 
2012. Figures in brackets are number of observations, and figures in parentheses are significant 
levels. 
 
3.4.2. Empirical Methodology and Results 
This section presents the empirical specifications and results of testing the cross-
sectional difference in households’ portfolio composition caused by households’ 
hedging demand for stocks, which in turn depends on housing supply elasticities 
and household lifecycles. I first examine the model implications on cross-
sectional difference in risk-asset share, and then proceed to subsample regressions 
by age group in order to investigate the lifecycle implications.    
In accordance to equation (35) and equation (34), the baseline specification are 
cross-section regressions with the risk-asset share of a household i  in MSA k  
 ,i k  as dependent variable and the MSA level variables of interest ( kx ) as 





, 0 1 ,i k k i k i kx Z         (36) 
where kx  is either the housing supply elasticity, the undevelopable land share, or 
the covariance between housing price growth and S&P returns. i  is a vector of 
household level controls including household head’s age, family size, log of 
mortgage payment, income relative to sample mean, total wealth relative to 
sample mean, dummy or category variables for household head’s education, 
gender, marital status, occupation, race, health status, and family composition 
change. k is a vector of MSA level controls including average unemployment 
rate, average population growth, and average GDP growth from 2007 to 2011, the 
standard deviation of real per capita income from 2008 to 2012, and the mean risk 
free saving to financial asset ratio of low income households.   
The conceptual framework in Section 3.3 predicts that households live in less 
elastic MSAs should invest relative more in stocks, indicating a negative sign on 
1  when the explanatory variable is the housing supply elasticity. Because the 
undevelopable land share is negative correlated with the housing supply elasticity, 
the sign on 1  should be positive when kx  is the undevelopable land share. 
Finally, according to equation (34), the sign on the covariance between housing 
price growth and S&P returns should be positive.  
Table 3.3 reports the estimation results, with column from (1) to (3) representing 
results from using either housing supply elasticities, undevelopable land shares, or 
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the covariance between housing price growth and S&P returns as explanatory 
variable, respectively. Column (1) of Table 3.3 shows that, as expected, the sign 
on the housing supply elasticity is significantly negative at 5% level: One unit 
decrease in the housing supply elasticity is associated with about 2.4% increases 
in the risk-asset share. Given the mean risk-asset share across households in the 
sample is 18%, the marginal effect of the housing supply elasticity on the risk-
asset share is economically substantial.  
To address the potential endogeneity problem caused by omitted and 
unobservable MSA characteristics that are correlated with both the housing 
supply elasticity and households’ investment behavior, I replace the housing 
supply elasticity with the undevelopable land share and repeats the analysis. 
Because the undevelopable land share is negatively correlated with the housing 
supply elasticity, and other mechanisms affecting the risk-asset share are unlikely 
to be systematically different in MSAs with high and low undevelopable land 
share, the measurement of land constraint is a valid proxy of the housing supply 
elasticity and should have positive effect on risk-asset shares. Column (2) of 
Table 3.3 reports the regression results of using the undevelopable land share as 
explanatory variable. Consistent with the theory, the sign on the undevelopable 
land share is significantly positive. The coefficient suggests that an increase of 10 
percentage point of the undevelopable land share will result in 1% increases in the 
risk-asset share. This lends further support to model predictions.  
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Table 3.3 Main results in cross-section regressions (PSID 2011) 
 
Dependent variable: risk-asset shares 
                                         (1) (2) (3) 
𝛽1: housing supply elasticity (Saiz (2010))                -0.024** 
                                           (0.0099) 
  𝛽1: undevelopable land  share (Saiz (2010)) 
 
0.10** 
                                          
 
(0.048) 
 𝛽1: cov(housing price growth, S&P returns)                                       
  
0.0014*** 
                                         
  
(0.00051) 
head’s age                                      0.0029*** 0.0029*** 0.0014 
                                         (0.00074) (0.00074) (0.00087) 
head has college degree                  0.078*** 0.078*** 0.069*** 
                                         (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) 
family size                              -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.013 
                                         (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0091) 
head is female                           -0.031* -0.033* -0.036* 
                                         (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) 
married                                  0.024 0.023 0.014 
                                         (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) 
mortgage payment                         0.0036** 0.0038** 0.0019 
                                         (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0022) 
income                                   0.025** 0.025** 0.042*** 
                                         (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
total wealth                             0.0082 0.0082 0.014*** 
                                         (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0049) 
mean risk free savings of low income households -0.00035 -0.00039 -0.00068** 
                                         (0.00036) (0.00037) (0.00033) 
average unemployment rate  (2007-2011)                                                                          -0.0046 -0.0031 -0.014** 
                                         (0.0072) (0.0068) (0.0068) 
average population growth  (2007-2011)                                                                          0.18 0.28 1.15 
                                         (0.53) (0.54) (0.79) 
average GDP growth  (2007-2011)                                                     0.0027 0.0057 0.013 
                                         (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0096) 
s.d. of real per capita income (2008-2012)                         0.048 0.013 -0.035 
                                         (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) 
Constant                                 -0.058 -0.18* 0.033 
                                         (0.11) (0.10) (0.078) 
Other individual controls                Yes Yes Yes 
State dummy                              Yes Yes Yes 
N                                        3397 3397 1695 
Adj. R-Square                            0.20 0.20 0.26 
Notes: This table reports the regression results of equation (36) using 2011 wave of PSID in combination with MSA 
level data. Estimations are by OLS. Column (1) to (2) uses the housing supply elasticity and undevelopable land share 
in Saiz (2010) as explanatory variables; column (3) uses the covariance between housing price growth and S&P 
returns as explanatory variable. Other individual controls include dummies for household head’s occupation, health 
status, family composition change, and race. Standard errors are clustered at MSAs and reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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The final column of Table 3.3 report the estimation results using the covariance 
between housing price growth and S&P return as explanatory variable. This is a 
direct test of model implications expressed in equation (34). Consistent with the 
model prediction, the covariance has significantly positive effect on risk-asset 
share. 10 basis point increases in the covariance between housing price growth 
and S&P returns correspond to 1.4% increases in risk-asset share of households’ 
portfolio, a number not too far away from model prediction in Section 3.1
40
.  
The effects of other control variables on risk-asset share are generally in line with 
existing findings. For example, the risk-asset shares increase with age, education, 
family income, and total wealth, and decrease with family size and if household 
head is female. Interestingly, as have been found in Heaton et al. (2000) and 
Cocco (2004), higher mortgage payment is positively correlated with higher risk-
asset share, suggesting households may finance stock investment via mortgage 
debt. Other regional variables generally have expected sign but are not 
statistically significant. For instance, the sign on mean risk free saving to financial 
asset ratio of low income households is negative, suggesting the worse the social 
security the lower the risk-asset share; high unemployment rate is associated with 
low risk-asset share, while high population and GDP growth are related to high 
risk-asset shares. However, although the coefficients are not significant, the 
regional labor income risk seems to have positive effect on risk-asset share. 
                                                 
40
 Recall that the simple calibration in Section 3.3.1 suggests 10 basis point increases in the 
covariance will cause risk-asset share increases 0.625%. 
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Possible explanation could be measurements error in labor regional labor income 
risks, or because high regional labor income risks are correlated with high labor 
incomes that are not captured by the included regional factors (e.g., GDP growth).    
The channel through which the housing supply elasticity has impact on the risk-
asset share depends on not only the negative effect of the housing supply 
elasticity on the covariance between housing price growth and S&P returns, but 
also the housing consumption plan of the households. If households currently own 
housing and have litter demand for upsizing housing consumption, their hedging 
demands for stocks are weak. Therefore, the effect of housing supply elasticity on 
risk-asset share, if any, should be moderate for old households, who are likely to 
downsizing their housing consumption in the future. Actually, the effect of the 
housing supply elasticity on risk-asset share could be opposite to the model 
prediction for old households because they are expecting a “short” position of 
housing in the future
41
. In contrast, young households have steepest lifecycle 
housing consumption profile, so they should have strongest hedging demand for 
stocks in expecting upcoming increases in housing consumptions. The 
dependence of hedging motive on the households’ lifecycle housing consumption 
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 Empirical evidence on the downsizing of housing at the old age is mixed. Chiuri et al. (2010) 
use 60 microeconomic surveys on about 300,000 individuals residing in 15 OECD countries to 
explore the pattern of elderly homeownership and find that ownership rates decline considerably 
after age 60 in all countries. Using U.S. data, Venti et al. (2004) find that old households are 
unlikely to discontinue homeownership and liquidate home equity to support general nonhousing 
consumption needs. Fang (2009) show that the empirical lifecycle housing consumption profile is 
not hump-shape for U.S. household. Rather, it first increases monotonically and then flattens out 




plan suggests the effect of housing supplies on risk-asset shares should be more 
pronounced for young households.  
To test the lifecycle implications of the model, I divide the samples into two 
different age groups: young households and old households. According to Fang 
(2009)’s estimates, the consumption profile for housing of the U.S. households 
starts to flattens out at about age 60 (see Figure 3 and Figure 4 therein). Therefore, 
I define young households as those of which the head’s age is not greater than 60, 
and repeat analyses of equation (36)  using the age subsamples. Table 3.4 shows 
the regression results, with the first three columns for young household samples 
and the last three columns for old household samples. Again, I use either the 
housing supply elasticity, the undevelopable land share, or the covariance 
between housing price growth and S&P returns as explanatory variable. The 
estimates for these variables have expected sign and are all significant for young 
household subsamples. They are all insignificant for the old age group.   
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Table 3.4 Results in cross-section regressions by age subsamples (2011 PSID) 
 Dependent variable: risk-asset shares 
 subsample: households’ age<61 subsample: households’ age>=61 
                                         (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
𝛽1: housing supply elasticity (Saiz (2010))                -0.021**   
-0.041 
  




𝛽1: undevelopable land  share (Saiz (2010))  
0.15***   -0.044 
 
                                         
 
(0.050)   (0.11) 
 
𝛽1: cov(housing price growth, S&P returns)                                        
 0.0012**   0.0017 
                                         
 
 (0.00048)   (0.0013) 
N                                        2735 2735 1393 662 662 302 
Adj. R-Square                            0.20 0.20 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.34 
Notes: This table reports the regression results of equation (36) by age subsamples using 2011 wave of PSID in combination 
with MSA level data. Estimations are by OLS. Controls are the same as those in Table 3.3. To conserve space, only selected 
coefficients are reported. Standard errors are clustered at MSAs and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
3.4.3. Robustness Check with Alternative Waves of the PSID 
I use earlier waves of the PSID to provide a robustness check of results from 2011 
wave of the PSID. Specifically, I use the 2001, 2005 and 2009 waves of the PSID 
to construct an unbalanced short panel, and then run pool cross-section 
regressions using this alternative samples. Due to lack of time-series measure of 
housing supply elasticity, we combine information on MSA population and 
undevelopable land shares to create a time-varying dummy variable 
(
,k tinelasticMSA ) to indicate whether a MSA has inelastic housing supply: the 
dummy equals to one if both the undevelopable land share and the population in 
the MSA is above the 75% percentile of their empirical distributions, and zero 
otherwise. As discusses in Saiz (2010),  the undevelopable land share is more 
likely to play role in affecting housing supply elasticity in MSAs with large 
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population. Although it is basically time-invariant, the populations in MSAs 
would have significant relative changes in the last decade
42
. Therefore, the 
inelasticity dummy variable 
,k tinelasticMSA  should be able to at least partially 
capture variations in the housing supply elasticity across MSAs and over time.  
Due to data availability, we do not collect regional economic factors in the pool 
cross-section regressions. Instead, I run pool cross-section regression with MSA × 
year dummies. This allows us to control for MSA and year effects at the expense 
of not identifying pure MSA level factors such as housing supply elasticity. 
However, we can explore the lifecycle implications of housing supply elasticity 
on risk-asset shares, following the identification strategy in Sinai et al. (2005). 
Explicitly, the econometric model is specified as follow: 
 
, , 0 1 , 2 , , , , ,i k t i t i t k t i t k t i k tYoung Young inelasticMSA MSA Year           
 (37) 
where is , ,i k t  the risk-asset share of a household living in MSA k  at time t . The 
,i tYoung  a dummy variable that equal one if the household head’s age is blow a 
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 For instance, 2010 census special reports on “Patterns of Metropolitan and Micropolitan 
Population Change” suggests that there are substantial geographic variation in population growth 
in the U.S. between 2000 and 2010, with rapid growth in some areas of the country and sizable 
declines in others. According to the report, the fastest-growing metro areas were located in either 
the South or the West, with fastest population gainers led by Palm Coast, FL, and followed by St. 
George, UT; Las Vegas-Paradise, NV; Raleigh-Cary, NC; and Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL. Two 
metro areas in the southern states of Louisiana and Arkansas (New Orleans and Pine Bluff, 
respectively) and three areas located partially or entirely in the states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
West Virginia (Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA; Johnstown, PA; and Steubenville-




cut-off age that defines young and zero if the household head’s age is above 4043. 
The 
,k tinelasticMSA , as discussed above, indicates whether a MSA k  at time t  
belongs to the inelastic MSA group. It equals klandshareHigh × ,k tpopulationHigh , 
with klandshareHigh  or ,k tpopulationHigh  being indicator that equals one if the 
corresponding variable in the MSA (undevelopable land share or the population) 
is above the 75% percentile of its empirical distribution. i  includes the same 
household level controls as before, and k tMSA Year  is a set of MSA × year 
dummies.  
The specification (37) compares the portfolio composition of young households 
and old households. Because the base group is the old households (
, 0i tYoung  ), 
1  tells the difference in risk-asset shares between these two demographic groups, 
ceteris paribus. More importantly, the specification (37) also compares the 
difference in risk-asset shares of young households across MSAs. The coefficient 
2  on the interaction term suggests additional difference in risk-asset shares of 
young households if they are from MSAs with inelastic housing supply. A 
positive 2  suggests they hold a higher risk-asset share in comparison with those 
in elastic MSAs.  
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 Note that we will experiment with different cut-off ages in order to examining how 𝛽2  is 
sensitive to the cut-off age defining young households. For the purpose of comparability, we 
exclude observations with household heads’ age falling in the range between the cut-off age and 
40, but keep households with age above 40 as the base group. 
90 
 
Because Fang (2009) shows that for both renter and home owners, the housing 
consumption plans have steepest slop before the age of 30.  To more sharply 
compare the difference in risk-asset shares of young households due to housing 
consumption hedging demand, I first set the cut-off age at 31 and report 
estimation results in Table 3.5.  The significant and negative 
1  shows that young 
households hold a smaller fraction of their financial portfolio in risky stocks than 
old households. However, the significant and positive 2  suggests that the gap is 
narrower if these young households live in MSAs with inelastic housing supply. 
All else equal, young households from MSAs with inelastic housing supply have 
risk-asset share about 4.4% higher than their counterparts from MSAs with elastic 
housing supply (about a quarter of the sample mean share of risky asset in 
household financial portfolio). The result provides significant evidence on the 




Table 3.5 Results with alternative waves of the PSID (PSID 2001, 2005, 2009) 
 
Dependent variable: risk-asset shares 
 
(1) 
𝛽1: Young households (age<31)                                                        -0.078*** 
                                                                                 (0.017) 
𝛽2: Young households (age<31) × inelastic MSA 0.044** 
                                                                                 (0.021) 
Age                                                                              0.0021*** 
                                                                                 (0.00048) 
Head has college degree                                                          0.13*** 
                                                                                 (0.0094) 
Family size                                                                      -0.0099*** 
                                                                                 (0.0034) 
Head is female                                                                   -0.0080 
                                                                                 (0.014) 
Married                                                                          0.042*** 
                                                                                 (0.013) 
Mortgage payment                                                                 0.0034*** 
                                                                                 (0.00099) 
Income                                                                           0.0080*** 
                                                                                 (0.0029) 
Total wealth                                                                     0.0040** 
                                                                                 (0.0017) 
Other individual controls                                                        Yes 
MSA × year dummies Yes 
N                                                                                10692 
Adj. R-Square                                                                    0.23 
Notes: This table reports the regression results of equation (37) using the alternative samples of 
unbalanced short panel constructed with the 2001, 2005 and 2009 waves of PSID. Estimation is by 
OLS. The base group consists of old households whose heads have age greater than 40. Other 
individual controls include dummies for household head’s occupation, health status, family 
composition change, and race. Standard errors are clustered at MSA × year cells and reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Figure 3.2 depicts how the coefficient 2  changes if we increase the cut-off age 
from 26 to 41. Consistent with the theory, 2  decreases with the cut-off age. For 
the youngest households (households’ age < 26),  because they have steepest 
housing consumption plan and the incentive to hedging housing consumption risk, 
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the relative difference in risk-asset shares in MSAs with elastic and inelastic 
housing supply are largest and significantly different from zero. As the cut-off age 
increases, both the magnitude and significance level of the difference decrease.  
Figure 3.2 𝜷𝟐 and confidence intervals in pool cross-section regressions 
 
Notes: The figure shows the sensitiveness of the coefficient on the interaction term of young 
household indicator and inelastic MSA indicator, 𝛽2 in equation (37), to the cut-off age defining 
young households. The coefficients 𝛽2 measure the extent to which young households in MSAs 
with inelastic housing supply have a greater share of risky asset in investment portfolio for 
housing consumption hedge. A lower bound of 95% confidence interval above zero indicates that 
the difference is significant at 5% level. MSAs are defined as inelastic if both the undevelopable 
land share and population are above the 75% percentile of their empirical distributions. Standard 
errors are clustered at MSA × year cells and are used to construct the 95% confidence intervals.  
 
3.5. Conclusion 
Households on a rising housing consumption path face price risks in places where 
housing supply is inelastic. In a simple two-period-two-good model we show that 
holding risky assets, whose returns are correlated with housing price shocks, 
provides consumption hedging benefits. In particular, this consumption benefit is 
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greater in places where housing supply elasticity is lower. Using recent waves of 
PSID, this paper shows that households living in MSAs with inelastic housing 
supply indeed hold relatively higher fraction of their financial portfolio in stocks. 
Consistent with the household lifecycle consumption theory, it is further shown 
that the effect of housing supply elasticity on risk-asset share is more pronounced 
for young households on the rising path of their housing consumption profile.  
The present study contributes to a growing literature on household housing 
consumption hedging behavior. In addition to its effects on homeownership (Sinai 
et al. (2005)), timing and size of housing consumption (Han (2008, 2010)), and 
the price-rent ratio in the housing market (Sinai et al. (2005) and Han (2013)), the 
housing consumption hedging incentive also significantly affect households’ 
investment choices, especially for young households. These findings suggest that 
financial innovations, such as housing futures and option contracts based on 
regional home price indices tied to regional housing price index (Case et al. 
(1993)), has a promising demand. As population continues to concentrate in larger 
and denser metropolitan areas, where housing supply elasticity tends to be lower, 
such demand is likely to increase. However, improving the attractiveness of a 
financial product to households is always challenging and would be a promising 




Chapter 4.  Competitive Consumption Spending and Labor 
Supply: Evidence from Regional Differences in Sex Ratio in China 
Abstract: Wei et al. (2011) show that the substantial increase in household saving in 
China since late 1990s may have to do with a rising male-female sex ratio. They find a 
higher sex ratio in a region in China makes parents with a young son save more for the 
son’s expenses, such as wedding and education, and also invest in a bigger home, to 
help the son compete in local marriage market. The present study investigates the 
impact of sex ratio on young males’ consumption spending and labor supply behavior. 
It is hypothesized that marriage market competition makes young males spend more 
where the sex ratio is higher – they may do so with financial support from their 
parents. Furthermore, young males in high sex ratio regions would also work harder, 
so that their earning would rise faster, in order to pay back their parents in the future. 
A large dataset of credit card account information of individuals across 31 provinces 
in China is employed to test these hypotheses. It is found that an additional percentage 
point in regional sex ratio of age 20 to 34 in 2005 is associated with two to three 
percent higher credit card balance for males in this cohort but not for females. It is also 
found that young males’ age profile of income to be steeper in provinces with higher 
sex ratio. These findings are consistent with the proposed hypotheses and suggest that 
the rising sex ratio in China may also have contributed to China’s high GDP growth 
through competitive consumer spending and labor supply by young males.   
Key words: sex ratio imbalance, competitive spending, labor supply 




Since the introduction of the one-child policy placing birth population control in 
1979, China has experience a significant rise in the sex ratio of male to female in 
recent decades. Especially, because of the parental preferences for sons that root in 
the traditional Chinese cultural norms and the adoption of Ultrasound B for prenatal 
screening, the sex ratio at birth has been became increasingly imbalanced since 
1980s and the maleness of young adults has progressively increased. According to 
Edlund et al. (2013), the sex ratio of young adults of 16 to 25 years old rose from 
1.02 to 1.06 between 1988 and 2004. This implies a very competitive marriage 
market for males. Even the Chinese government has recently relaxed the one-child 
policy, because the sex ratio imbalance at birth has been increasing steadily in the 
last 30 years, the sex ratio imbalance for young adults and the competitiveness of 
marriage market would continue to rise for at least two decades.  
Motived by recent studies about the effects of rising sex ratio imbalance in China on 
social and economic variables such as saving rates and crime rates (Edlund et al. 
(2013); Wei et al. (2011)), this paper investigates males’ credit card spending 
behavior and working efforts in associated with sex ratios. Different from Wei et al. 
(2011) which shows that parents with a son have competitive saving motive to 
improve their son’ relative standing in the marriage market, this paper hypothesizes 
that the male children themselves (young adults) have competitive consumption 
motive in order to attract marriage partners. This hypothesis is developed based on 
two observations: First, the parents’ competitive savings shown in Wei et al. (2011) 
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are related to their children’s future consumption (especially housing consumption). 
it can be considered that, with financial support from their parents, young males can 
increase current consumption as a signal of attractiveness. Second, although it is 
limited by the line of credit, the use of credit cards is convenient. More importantly, 
because the credit market is still in the embryonic stage in China and consequently 
credit cards are normally marketed to individuals with relative stable and high 
income, the use of credit cards can signal the social-economic status of card holders 
(Worthington (2003), Estelami et al. (2007) and Worthington et al. (2011)). 
Therefore, it can be conjectured that due to the rising sex ratios that stiffen the 
competition in marriage market, males have competitive spending motive, and this 
motive induce males in places with more imbalanced sex ratios to increase the usage 
of credit cards and thus have higher balance in their credit card accounts. In addition, 
in order to pay back to their parents, e.g., via financial support for their parents’ 
retirement, young males in high sex ratio regions would also work harder, so that we 
also conjecture their earning would rise faster.  
Using a unique dataset of credit card account information covering 31 provinces and 
the inferred sex ratios for young adults in 2005 at province level based on the 2010 
population census in China, this paper finds empirical evidence for a positive 
relationship between sex ratios and males’ credit card balance and working efforts. 
In particular, it is shown that one percentage increase in the local sex ratio for age 20 
to 34 is associated with 2% - 3% increase in males’ credit card balance and about 
0.44% increase in males’ income path. Interestingly, the falsification exercises show 
that these effects are not significant or even become negative if the samples are 
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restricted to female observations. Recognizing that the sex ratios of young adults in 
2005 inferred from the 2010 population census are potentially measured with errors 
due to population migration and different mortality rates for males and females, an 
alternative measurement of the sex ratios based on both 2000 and 2010 population 
censuses is constructed. It is found that the results are robust to this alternative 
construction of sex ratios. 
These findings are consistent with the view that higher sex ratios have increased 
females’ bargaining power in the marriage market and men tend to exert every effort 
to increase their attractiveness to mates in response to rising pressure in the marriage 
market. On one hand, it is well known that an increase in the sex ratio may increase 
the intensity of intra-sexual competition for status to attract mates. On one hand, 
because a credit card applicant in China has to convince the credit card issuers that 
he/she can meet the payment timely with a stable income, the use of credit card 
serves well as signals of social status because of its visibility. Therefore, as shown by 
results in this paper, men present their attractiveness and social-economic status to a 
marriage partner through swiping credit cards. This is similar to display conspicuous 
consumption to signal desirable mate qualities (Griskevicius et al. (2007) and Sundie 
et al. (2011)). Results in this paper paint a full picture which suggests that high sex 
ratios increase males’ demand for showy spending – i.e., spending through the use of 
credit cards – to improve their marriage prospect and lead males to work harder to 
have steeper income path. By examining the competitive spending motive of the 
males themselves and their effort in improving income prospects, this paper 
complements to Wei et al. (2011) and contributes to the literature by showing 
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evidence of competitive spending motives and increased working effort induced by 
imbalance sex ratios.  These results suggest that the high GDP growth in China may 
have to do with the rising sex ratio imbalance through its effect on competitive 
consumption spending and labor supply of young males. 
The paper is organized as followed: Section 4.2 is a brief review on related works, 
followed by empirical analyses in Section 4.3, where data, descriptive statistics and 
results are discussed; as a robustness check, Section 4.4 contains a repeated 
empirical analyses with an alternative construction of sex ratios and discuss the 
results; finally, Section 4.5 concludes.   
4.2. Literature Review 
A first strand of literature relevant to the current study is the theory of marriage and 
how changes in the sex ratio affect male’s and female’s bargaining power that in turn 
have consequences on social and economic variables. Becker’s model of marriage 
and family formation (Becker (1973); Becker (1974)) provide a theoretical 
framework to understand these effects. For instance, Becker notes that an increase in 
the sex ratio (of male to female) will increases the demand for wives as it enhances 
the role of female in the output of the joint production of a marriage. An important 
implication of Becker’s theory relevant to the current study is that men are motived 
to invest in characteristics (e.g., education) in order to become attractive in markets 
where the marginal product of women in marriage is high. This implies a positive 
correlation between sex ratios and males’ characteristics such as education and 
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earnings. Consistent with theories that female bargaining power in the marriage 
market increases with sex ratios, Angrist (2002) finds higher sex ratios have a 
positive effect on the likelihood of female marriage and male’s earnings but negative 
effect on female labor force participation. Similarly, Chiappori et al. (2002) provide 
both structural model and empirical evidence (using PSID data for the 1989 
interview year) that rise in the sex ratios leads to a reduction in female labor supply 
and an increase in male labor supply.   
However, while the existing theories of marriage generally focus on the bargaining 
position of man and woman and the intra-household allocation of resources, few 
studies, both theoretically or empirically, examine effects of imbalanced sex ratios 
on consumption. If women are scarce, the intensity of intra-sexual competition for 
mates will reasonably trigger men to increase their showy consumption as a signal of 
their attractiveness. Sundie et al. (2011) investigate this hypothesis and find 
conspicuous consumption indeed serves as a social signal directed at potential mates, 
although they also find men who conspicuously consume more likely target at short-
term mating. On the other hand, psychologists find that a scarcity of women leads 
people to expect that men spend more money during courtship (such as by paying 
bills or engagement rings); it also leads men to discount the future more heavily and 
incur debt for immediate expenditures (Griskevicius et al. (2012)). This study uses 
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the balance on credit card accounts as instrument for consumption and test whether it 
increases with sex ratios
44
.  
Another strand of literature works on how status competition can alter agents’ 
consumption and saving behavior (Cole et al. (1992); Hopkins et al. (2004); Hopkins 
et al. (2006)). For instance, Cole et al. (1992) introduce a matching process of man 
and woman into the classical growth model that provides man an incentive to save 
beyond that captured by standard models. As pointed out by Wei et al. (2011), 
however, this strand of literature normally does not feature sex ratio imbalance. This 
paper empirically address how the status competition for attracting marriage partners 
resulted from imbalanced sex ratios affect males’ spending behavior.   
Finally, the rising sex ratio imbalance in recent decades in China has been attracting 
attention from economist and blamed for the high household savings (Wei et al. 
(2011)) and the increase in crime (Edlund et al. (2013)). With the examination of the 
effect of imbalanced sex ratios on male’s credit card spending and income path, this 
study continues in this line of research. 
4.3. Empirical Analysis 
4.3.1. Data 
The main source of data is a unique dataset provided by one of the major Chinese 
banks about individual’s credit card information covering 31 provinces in China. The 
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 The credit card balance potentially captures both the men’s “showy” purpose to attract mates and 
their desire for “immediate” gratification, which we cannot disentangle.    
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dataset contains individual particulars such as gender, age, marital status, education, 
job industry, job seniority, and the zip code of their residence. It also contains 
information about credit card balance, personal income, credit card line, quasi-credit 
card line, and loan line at the time of retrieving information, which concentrates in 
2005 and 2006
45
. Initially, the dataset has about 1.5 million observations. However, 
we have to exclude observations having missing values in variables of interest, e.g., 
education, occupation, job seniority, zip code, and personal income. In addition, 
because the effect of imbalanced sex ratio on credit card spending, if exists, may 
limit to relative young people, the sample is further restricted to populations with age 
between 18 and 49. To reduce noise, the top 1% and the bottom 5% of samples in 
terms of their personal income, credit line and the top 1% of samples in terms of 
credit card balance are removed. These steps left us with about 50 thousands of 
observations in the regression analysis.  
The second set of data is about regional variables that are used to control for regional 
effects on individual spending behavior. These variables mostly measure the 
economic climate in provinces, including GDP growth from 2000 to 2005, per capita 
income, share of labor force enrolled in social security, and share of SOE 
employment in total labor force in 2005 at provincial level. They are obtained from 
Wei et al. (2011), where they are used as controls for regional effects on households’ 
saving behavior. I also obtain the average residential housing price in 2006 from 
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 Quasi-credit card is a debit card that has credit function but may require collateral (e.g., a security 
deposit or the guarantee of the monthly salary payment) to function as credit card. It is a transitional 
product at the early stage of developing credit market in China.  
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Chinese Real Estate Statistics Yearbook as a control for the effect of housing pricing 
on credit card spending
46
.   
The last key regional variable is the sex ratio of male to female at provincial level. 
Because the credit card balances are retrieved mainly in 2005 and 2006, we ideally 
would like to know sex ratios for each age cohort in every region during that period. 
However, such data are not obtainable because the Chinese population census is 
carried out only about every 10 years (e.g., in 1982, 1990, 2000, and 2010). In 
addition, the public available population census data assembly only reports the 
population for age cohort of every five years, e.g., 0, 1-4, 5-9, 10-14, etc. Therefore, 
the inferred sex ratios of age group of 20-34 in 2005 based on the sex ratios of the 
25-39 cohort in 2010 population census are used in the empirical analyses
47
. As 
mentioned in Wei et al. (2011), this method of inferring the sex ratio is likely to 
underestimate the actual sex ratio in 2005 because the mortality rates for boys and 
young men are generally slightly higher than those for girls and young women. 
However, because the underestimations are common across all provinces, the 
measurement errors will only affect the constants in the regression results unless the 
differences in the mortality rates between young men and young women have 
significant provincial variation, which we do not notice any supportive anecdotes or 
studies.  
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 See the average residential housing price in 2006 at provincial level at:  
http://tongji.cnki.net/kns55/addvalue/areaindusdevelop.aspx?sicode=Z013&areacode=xj05 
47
 Initially, I inferred the sex ratio of male to female for two age groups, e.g., age 20-34 and age 35-49, 
in 2005 from the 2010 population census by calculating the sex ratio of age groups of 25-39 and 40-
54 in 2010. As it is found that sex ratios of the two age groups are higher correlated, with correlation 
coefficient being 0.8396, the sex ratio of the younger cohort is chosen in the empirical analyses. I 
have also inferred the sex ratio of a broader age group of 15-34 in 2005 from 2010 population census 
and found its correlation with the sex ratio of age group of 20-34 in 2005 is 0.995. 
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4.3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 describes the summary statistics of key variables. Panel A of Table 4.1 
shows that the sex ratio have substantial variation across provinces. The mean of 
sex ratios in provinces with high sex ratio is 1.10 with standard deviation of 5%, 
while the mean of sex ratios in provinces with low sex ratio is 1.01 with standard 
deviation of 3%
48
. Examining other regional variables, we observe that provinces 
with high sex ratios are normally more developed regions, as evident by the mean 
of per capita income, GDP growth, and residential housing price. Panel B of 
Table 4.1 shows that the average credit card balance is 685.14 RMB in the sample. 
With an average annual income of 51 thousands RMB, this means that the credit 
card balance is about 16.1% of monthly income. Comparing the mean of credit 
card balances in provinces with high sex ratios and provinces with low sex ratios, 
we can see that the mean of credit card balance in regions with high sex ratios is 
clearly higher than that in regions with low sex ratios (765.91 versus 580.35). We 
can also see the mean of income and total line (the sum of credit card line, quasi-
credit card line, and loan line) are higher in regions with more imbalanced sex 
ratios. This further shows that, as suggested by the summary statistics of the 
regional variables, provinces with high sex ratios are generally richer. These 
summary statistics are suggestive that people in regions with more imbalanced 
sex ratio have higher income and spend more using credit cards. However, the 
standard deviations of the credit card balances and income within each group of 
provinces easily overwhelm the differences between the groups of regions. 
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 The sex ratio is defined as high if it is greater than the mean of sex ratio across provinces. 
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics 
 
All samples 
Samples in provinces with 
low sex ratio 
Samples in provinces with 
high sex ratio 
 
N Mean Std Dev  N Mean Std Dev  N Mean Std Dev 
Panel A: Summary statistics of regional variables          
Sex ratio 31 1.05 0.06 17 1.01 0.03 14 1.10 0.05 
Per capita income (in thousand) 31 5.71 3.23 17 4.69 1.27 14 6.95 4.37 
GDP growth from 2000 to 2005 31 42.51 6.84 17 42.21 6.55 14 42.87 7.41 
Share of labor force enrolled in social security 31 29.68 20.06 17 25.13 13.70 14 35.22 25.25 
Share of SOE employment in total labor force 31 11.30 4.79 17 9.70 3.68 14 13.24 5.39 
Residential housing price in 2006 (in thousand) 31 2.70 1.51 17 2.16 0.60 14 3.36 2.00 
Panel B: Summary statistics of individual variables 
      
Credit card balance (in thousand) 937,793 685.14 2167.43 408,207 580.35 1917.05 529,586 765.91 2339.03 
Income (in thousand) 279,099 50.99 52.25 121,059 39.39 44.31 158,040 59.88 56 
Total line (in thousand) 1,008,223 85.24 167.55 447,451 60.8 123.83 560,772 104.74 193.34 
Male 1,021,794 0.59 0.49 450,725 0.6 0.49 571,069 0.58 0.49 
Single 894,878 0.27 0.44 426,695 0.21 0.41 468,183 0.32 0.47 
Age 1,024,082 35.28 6.92 452,063 35.61 6.42 572,019 35.01 7.28 
Education 1,024,082 0.18 0.38 452,063 0.17 0.38 572,019 0.18 0.39 
Job industry 1,024,082 0.23 0.57 452,063 0.21 0.54 572,019 0.25 0.59 
Job seniority 1,024,082 4.47 21.9 452,063 3.08 14.34 572,019 5.57 26.33 
Note: The sample is restricted to those who are between 18 and 49 years old. Sex ratios are the ratio of male to female between the ages of 20-34 at provincial level in 
2005, inferred from the 2010 population census.  It is defined as high if it is higher than the mean of sex ratios across provinces.  Per capita income, Share of labor force 
enrolled in social security, Share of SOE employment in total labor force are percentage points and data in 2005. Together with GDP growth from 2000 to 2005, these 
variables are obtained from Wei et al. (2011). Credit card balance, income, and total line (credit card line, quasi-credit card line, and loan line) are all in logs. Education, 
job industry, and job seniority are categorical variables, while male and single are dummies. 
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4.3.3. The Effect of Sex Ratio on Credit Card Balance 
To test the hypothesis of competitive spending, the econometric model is specificed 
as followed:  
 , 0 1  i j j i j ibal sexRatio e             (38) 
where ,i jbal  is the log of  credit card balance of individual i  in region j
49
; 
jsexRatio  is the sex ratio in region j ; 1  is the coefficient of interest, measuring the 
marginal effect of jsexRatio  on ,i jbal ; i  is a set of individual controls that include 
gender, marital status, education, job industry, job seniority, age, age squared, log of 
income, and square of log of income etc; j  is a vector of regional controls that 
consist of GDP growth in the last 5 years, per capita income, share of labor force 
enrolled in social security, share of SOE employment in total labor force in 2005, 
and residential housing price in 2006. These regional controls are added following 
Wei et al. (2011), because they potentially affect individual’s consumption and 
saving behavior. The equation (38) is implemented with three different set of 
samples. I first run regression using full samples, and then restrict to female 
subsamples and male subsamples. In each set of regressions, two different variables 
are used as control of personal income due to concerns about measurement errors in 
the income variable. Explicitly, Model A utilizes the log of income variable itself 
and Model B use the log of total line (the sum of credit card line, quasi-credit card 
                                                 
49
 Note that because many observations have zero credit card balance at the time of retrieving 
information, we add 1 to the credit card balance before taking log.  
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line, and loan line) as control for personal income, respectively. Since the line of 
credit is normally approved based on banks’ discreet judgment on the prospect and 
riskiness of individual’s income, the total line would be a good measure of the card 
holders’ income profile.   
Table 4.2 reports the regression results. It shows that for the full sample, the 
marginal effect of sex ratio on credit card balance is positively significant in both 
Model A and Model B, implying that one percentage increase in sex ratio is 
associated with about 1.5 percentage higher in credit card balance. Interestingly, as 
can be seen from the middle panel of Table 4.2, the marginal effect disappears if we 
restrict observations to female subsamples. In addition, the coefficients on sex ratio 
in Model B for female sample are negative, which suggests female in regions with 
more imbalanced sex ratio may have lower credit card balance. By contrast, the 
coefficients on sex ratio become greater and positively significant when we restrict 
observations to male subsamples. For model A, the marginal effect of sex ratio on 
male’s credit card balance is now about 2.5, implying that one percentage increase in 
sex ratio is associated with 2.5 percentage higher in male’s credit card balance. 
Given that the mean of male’s credit card balance is 762 RMB and the mean of sex 
ratios across province being 1.05,   a 10 percentage increase in sex ratio from 1.05 to 
1.15 is at lease associated with about 190 RMB increase in monthly credit card 
spending. With a multiplier of the size of male population, the aggregate effect of 




Table 4.2 Sex ratio effect on credit card balance 
 Dependent variable: log of credit card balance 
 
All population  Female  Male 
                          Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Sex ratio                 1.56** 1.49*** 0.19 -0.13 2.36*** 2.52*** 
                          (0.63) (0.52) (1.03) (0.82) (0.79) (0.68) 
























Male                      0.12*** 0.16*** 
    
                          (0.028) (0.026) 
    
Married                    0.26*** 0.26*** 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 
                          (0.033) (0.032) (0.056) (0.053) (0.042) (0.040) 
Age                       0.014 -0.070*** -0.018 -0.078** 0.014 -0.085*** 
                          (0.024) (0.023) (0.041) (0.038) (0.030) (0.029) 
Age squared               -0.0011*** 0.000086 -0.00041 0.00043 -0.0012*** 0.00015 
                          (0.00032) (0.00030) (0.00056) (0.00051) (0.00040) (0.00038) 
Constant                  -2.16** 2.44*** 0.77 4.42*** -3.21*** 1.76** 
                          (0.90) (0.70) (1.54) (1.16) (1.12) (0.89) 
Education,  Job 
industry,  Job 
seniority, and  
Regional controls                                                
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N                         65949 75511 21237 25014 44712 50497 
Adj. R-Square             0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Note: The sample is restricted to those who are between 18 and 49 years old. Sex ratios are the ratio of male 
to female between the ages of 20-34 at provincial level in 2005, inferred from the 2010 population census. 
Model A and Model B use log of income and log of total line (credit card line, quasi-credit card line, and loan 
line) to control for income, respectively. Education, job industry and job seniority are categorical variables, 
while married is dummy variable. Regional control includes per capita income in 2005, GDP growth from 
2000 to 2005, share of labor force enrolled in social security in 2005, share of SOE employment in total labor 
force in 2005, which are obtained from Wei et al. (2011), and residential housing price in 2006. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
To further examine whether the effects of sex ratio on male’s credit card spending 
depend on marital status, housing status and age, I implement econometric model 
similar to equation (38) again on male subsample but add interaction terms into the 
model. Explicitly, I first interact sex ratio with marital status to see whether married 
male is less affected by the sex ratio; I then interact sex ratio with housing status to 
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examine whether housing owners are differently affected by the sex ratio; and finally 
we interact sex ratio with an age group dummy which equals one if the sample’s age 
is between 35 and 49 and zero otherwise. The regression results of each interaction 
specification are reported in the left panel, middle panel, and right panel of Table 4.3, 
respectively. First, compared to the coefficient on the sex ratio in the right panel of 
Table 4.2, the coefficients on sex ratio in Table 4.3 are generally greater. This 
suggests that the base group, which is single male in each panel of Table 4.3, is most 
sensitively affected by the imbalanced sex ratio. Second, expect for the last column 
of Table 4.3, coefficients on the interaction term of the sex ratio with marital status, 
housing status, and age group are not significant, showing that the effect of sex 
ration on credit card spending for married males, male housing owners and older 
males are not statistically different from its effect on single males. Although the 
coefficients on the interaction terms are mostly not significant, they have expected 
signs. For example, married male and older are less affected by sex ratio, while male 
housing owners seem to react more to a rise in the sex ratio.  
Overall, the results lend supports to the hypothesis that because of imbalanced sex 
ratios, males increase their credit card spending to attract females and improve their 
competitiveness in the marriage market. However, although the robust standard 
errors reported in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 take into account issues concerning 
heteroskedasticity and lack of normality, there may be correlations among 
observations in one region that should not be overlooked. Table 4.4 reports results 
with standard errors clustered at city level. It shows that standard errors on sex ratio 
are larger than those reported in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, 
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Table 4.3 Sex ratio effect on male’s credit card balance 
 Dependent variables: log of male’s credit card balance 
 Sex ratio  interacts with 
marital status 
 
Sex ratio  interacts with 
housing status 
 
Sex ratio  interacts with 
age group 
                          Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Sex ratio                 3.01*** 3.22*** 2.09*** 2.25*** 2.54*** 2.96*** 
                          (1.00) (0.90) (0.81) (0.70) (0.95) (0.84) 
Married * Sex ratio       -0.94 -0.97     
                          (0.85) (0.80)     
Own housing * Sex ratio     1.33 1.28   
                            (0.99) (0.93)   
Older (35~49) * Sex ratio        -0.30 -0.73 
     (0.81) (0.76) 
Income (log)                   0.44***  0.44***  0.44***  
                          (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  
Total line (log)                                  0.071***  0.071***  0.071*** 
                           (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
Age                       0.013 -0.086*** 0.014 -0.085*** 0.049 -0.073** 
                          (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.034) (0.032) 
Age squared               -0.0012*** 0.00017 -0.0012*** 0.00016 -0.0015*** 0.000039 
                          (0.00040) (0.00038) (0.00040) (0.00038) (0.00043) (0.00041) 
Married                   0.81 0.86 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 
                          (0.90) (0.84) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) 
Own housing                 -1.46 -1.40   
                            (1.05) (0.98)   
Older (35~49)          0.17 0.71 
     (0.86) (0.79) 
Constant                  -3.68*** 1.23 -2.91** 2.07** -4.12*** 1.06 
                          (1.27) (1.07) (1.13) (0.91) (1.29) (1.07) 
Education,  Job industry,  
Job seniority, and  
Regional controls                                                               
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N                         44712 50497 44712 50497 44712 50497 
Adj. R-Square             0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Note: The sample is restricted to male who are between 18 and 49 years old. Sex ratios are the ratio of male to 
female between the ages of 20-34 at provincial level in 2005, inferred from the 2010 population census. Model A and 
Model B use log of income and log of total line (credit card line, quasi-credit card line, and loan line) to control for 
income, respectively. Education, job industry and job seniority are categorical variables, while married is dummy 
variable. The base group is single male (left panel), single male housing renter (middle panel), and single young male 
(right panel). Regional controls include per capita income in 2005, GDP growth from 2000 to 2005, share of labor 
force enrolled in social security in 2005, share of SOE employment in total labor force in 2005, which are obtained 
from Wei et al. (2011), and residential housing price in 2006. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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indicating positive correlations among observations at the cluster level
50
. 
Unsurprisingly, most of the coefficients on sex ratio become insignificant because of 
cluster error given that we only have sex ratio at provincial level. Nonetheless, it is 
worth mentioning that for the single males, the effect of sex ratio on credit card 
balance remains significant at 10% level (see the first two columns of the bottom 
panel in Table 4.4).  This suggests that marriage market competition could induce 
competitive spending motive, especially for single males.  
Table 4.4 Regression results with cluster error 
Dependent variable: log of credit card balance 
 
All population  Female  Male 
                          Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Sex ratio                 1.56 1.49 0.19 -0.13 2.36 2.52 
                          (1.57) (1.70) (1.57) (1.39) (1.85) (2.06) 
Dependent variables: log of male’s credit card balance (Male subsample) 
 Sex ratio  interacts with 
marital status  
Sex ratio  interacts 
with housing status  
Sex ratio  interacts 
with age group 
 Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Sex ratio                 3.01* 3.22* 2.09 2.25 2.54 2.96 
 (1.55) (1.90) (1.87) (2.13) (1.81) (2.05) 
Notes: This table reports the standard errors of the coefficients on sex ratio corrected for clustering at 
city level. The upper panel corresponds to Table 4.2 and the bottom panel corresponds to Table 4.3. 
Other controls are the same as the corresponding tables but omitted. Clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
In the next section, we proceed to test the second hypothesis that males in regions 
with more imbalanced sex ratio also have to working harder to repay the debt and 
sustain the standard of livings.   
                                                 
50
 The standard errors in Table 4.4 are clustered at the first three digits of zip code. According to the 
coding rule of zip code in China, this can be interpreted as clustering at city level.  
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4.3.4. The Effect of Sex Ratio on Income Path 
The econometric model of testing the effect of sex ratios on income path is specified 
as followed: 
       
, 0 0 1
,
 +  *
*
hsr
i j i j i
j j i i j
inc Age Age D
province Age RegionalControls e
   





  (39) 
where ,i jinc  is the log of income, measured by income variable itself and total line in 
Model A and Model B, respectively; hsrjD  is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
sex ratio in region j  is greater than the mean of sex ratios across provinces and zero 
otherwise; the coefficient 1  measures the slope of income path on top of 0  if the 
observation is from provinces with more imbalanced sex ratio. Similar to equation 
(38), I include other individual controls such as marital status, education, job 
industry, job seniority in i . I use the dummy jprovince  to control for regional 
fixed effect so j  captures differences in the intercept. To address the concerns that 
the sex ratios may capture the effect of omitted regional variables on the income-age 
profile, the age variable is also interacted with regional controls, such as GDP 
growth, share of labor force enrolled in social security and housing price.   
I run regression with female and male subsamples. We expect 1  to be significantly 
positive for male, suggesting that the income path for male in provinces with more 
imbalanced sex ratio is steeper. The regression results of the above specification are 
reported in Table 4.5. For the first two columns of Table 4.5, we can see that the 
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coefficients on “Age ×  High sex ratio dummy” are not significant for female 
subsamples. The sign is even negative in Model A. In contrast, the coefficient on the 
interaction term in Model A is significantly positive for the male subsample. The 
result suggests that the slope of male’s income path in provinces with more 
imbalanced sex ratios is about 0.44% steeper. When the income is measured using 
total credit line, the coefficient on the interaction term is also not significant for male 
subsample, but the probability of nil effect is much lower in comparison with female 
subsample. These results suggest that males in regions with high sex ratio have 
steeper age-income profile.  
Table 4.5 Sex ratio effect on income path 
 Dependent variable: log of income 
 Female subsample  Male subsample 
                                    Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Age                                 0.0030 0.010 -0.011*** 0.014** 
                                    (0.0048) (0.0076) (0.0038) (0.0054) 
Age × High sex ratio dummy            -0.00047 0.0030 0.0044*** 0.0034 
                                    (0.0024) (0.0039) (0.0016) (0.0024) 
Constant                            9.70*** 9.89*** 9.10*** 9.90*** 
                                    (0.19) (0.28) (0.12) (0.18) 
Married                      Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education                           Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job industry                        Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job seniority                       Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age * GDP growth               Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age * Share of labor force 
enrolled in social security               
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age * Housing price                Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fix effect                   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N                                   28779 33398 61888 69419 
Adj. R-Square                       0.26 0.23 0.23 0.20 
Note: The sample is restricted to those who are between 18 and 49 years old, with first two columns 
for female subsample and the last two columns for male subsample. Sex ratios are the ratio of male 
to female between the ages of 20-34 at provincial level in 2005, inferred from the 2010 population 
census. The high sex ratio dummy equals one if the sex ratio is higher than the mean of sex ratios 
113 
 
across provinces. Education, job industry and job seniority are categorical variables, while married is 
dummy variable. Model A and Model B use log of income and log of total line (credit card line, 
quasi-credit card line, and loan line) as the dependent variable, respectively. Regressions in the first 
two columns interact age with high sex ratio dummy only, regressions in the third and four column 
allow age interact with other individual controls, and finally regressions in the last two columns 
further interact age with regional controls. For the regional variables, GDP growth is the mean 
growth from 2000 to 2005 and share of labor force enrolled in social security is data in 2005, both of 
which are obtained from Wei et al. (2011); the residential housing price is data in 2006. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
4.4. Robustness Check with Alternative Construction of Sex Ratio 
In this section presents empirical results with alternative construction of sex ratio as 
a robustness check. In the last section, the sex ratios of age group of 20-34 in 2005 is 
inferred from the 2010 population census only. This method of inferring sex ratios 
overlooks population migrations and may result in measurement error in the inferred 
sex ratios. By contrast, I construct the sex ratios of age group of 20-34 in 2005 based 
on both the 2000 population census and the 2010 population census and use them in 
the empirical analyses in this section. Specifically, since people aged 20-34 in 2005 
are 15-29 years old in 2000 and 25-39 years old in 2010, I sum up the population of 
aged 15-29 in the 2000 population census and the population of aged 25-39 in the 
2010 population census in each province for male and female, respectively, and then 
divide the sum of male by the sum of female to arrive the sex ratio:
male age 15-29 in 2000 + male age 25-39 in 2010
 of age 20-34 in 2005
female age 15-29 in 2000 + female age 25-39 in 2010
sexRatio   (40) 
Using both 2000 census and 2010 census to construct the sex ratio has advantage 
over inferring it from either wave of the population censuses. First, because young 
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adults aged about 18 are very likely to leave the province of birth due to college 
enrollment after high school and college graduates aged between 20 and 30 are also 
mobile to seek employment after graduating from college, inferring sex ratio from 
either the 2000 census or the 2010 census overlooks the potential bias caused by 
migrations. Second, as mentioned in Wei et al. (2011), due to different mortality 
rates for males and females, inferring the sex ratio from either the 2000 census or the 
2010 census is likely to underestimate or overestimate the actual sex ratio in 2005. 
Therefore, because the credit card information in the sample is archived in 2005 and 
2006, which are in the middle of 2000-2010, constructing the sex ratio of aged 15-34 
in 2005 using both waves of population census can average out measurement errors 
caused by migrations or different mortality rates for males and females.  
The analyses of model specification (38) for credit card balance and model 
specification (39) for income path using the alternative construction of sex ratios and 
report the empirical results are reported in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7, respectively
51
. It 
can be seen that results shown in Table 4.6  are similar to these in Table 4.2. 
Importantly, Table 4.6 shows that only males’ credit card balances are significantly 
affected by the sex ratio and the coefficients on the sex ratio for the female 
subsamples is negative (although they are not significant). Similar to results in Table 
4.5, the coefficients on “Age × High sex ratio dummy” in Table 4.7 are positively 
significant (except the last column) for male subsample when income is measured by 
                                                 
51
 In repeating model specification (38), we have also further interacted sex ratio with dummies for 
marital status, housing status and age group and find the results are similar to those shown in Table 
4.3. To conserve space, the results with interaction terms are not reported. 
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the income variable itself, suggesting that the slope of male’s income path in 
provinces with more imbalanced sex ratios is steeper. 
Table 4.6 Sex ratio effect on credit card balance: alternative construction of sex ratio 
 Dependent variable: log of credit card balance 
 
All population  Female  Male 
                          Model A Model B Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Sex ratio                 0.97 1.60** -1.47 -0.81 2.45** 3.17*** 
                          (0.96) (0.80) (1.58) (1.24) (1.21) (1.05) 
























Male                      0.13*** 0.16*** 
                              (0.028) (0.026) 
    Married                    0.25*** 0.26*** 0.35*** 0.39*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 
                          (0.033) (0.032) (0.056) (0.053) (0.042) (0.040) 
Age                       0.014 -0.070*** -0.018 -0.078** 0.015 -0.084*** 
                          (0.024) (0.023) (0.041) (0.038) (0.030) (0.029) 
Age squared               -0.0011*** 0.000082 -0.00041 0.00043 -0.0012*** 0.00014 
                          (0.00032) (0.00030) (0.00056) (0.00051) (0.00040) (0.00038) 
Constant                  -1.61 2.35*** 2.31 5.06*** -3.28** 1.18 
                          (1.12) (0.90) (1.89) (1.45) (1.41) (1.16) 
Education,  Job 
industry,  Job 
seniority, and  
Regional 
controls                                                
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N                         65949 75511 21237 25014 44712 50497 
Adj. R-Square             0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Note:  The sample is restricted to those who are between 18 and 49 years old. Sex ratios are the ratio of male to 
female between the ages of 20-34 at provincial level in 2005, inferred from both the 2000 population census and 
the 2010 population census (see equation (40)). Model A and Model B use log of income and log of total line 
(credit card line, quasi-credit card line, and loan line) to control for income, respectively. Education, job industry 
and job seniority are categorical variables, while married is dummy variable. Regional control includes per capita 
income in 2005, GDP growth from 2000 to 2005, share of labor force enrolled in social security in 2005, share of 
SOE employment in total labor force in 2005, which are obtained from Wei et al. (2011), and residential housing 
price in 2006. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% 




Table 4.7 Sex ratio effect on income path: alternative construction of sex ratio 
 Dependent variable: log of income 
 Female subsample  Male subsample 
                                    Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Age                                 0.0036 0.010 -0.012*** 0.012** 
                                    (0.0048) (0.0075) (0.0037) (0.0053) 
Age × High sex ratio dummy            0.00040 0.0028 0.0038*** 0.00099 
                                    (0.0021) (0.0036) (0.0015) (0.0022) 
Constant                            9.67*** 9.90*** 9.12*** 9.98*** 
                                    (0.18) (0.27) (0.12) (0.18) 
Married                      Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Education                           Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job industry                        Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Job seniority                       Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age * GDP growth               Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age * Share of labor force 
enrolled in social security               
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age * Housing price                Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fix effect                   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N                                   28779 33398 61888 69419 
Adj. R-Square                       0.26 0.23 0.23 0.20 
Note: The sample is restricted to those who are between 18 and 49 years old, with first two 
columns for female subsample and the last two columns for male subsample. Sex ratios are 
the ratio of male to female between the ages of 20-34 at provincial level in 2005, inferred from 
the 2010 population census. The high sex ratio dummy equals one if the sex ratio is higher 
than the mean of sex ratios across provinces. Education, job industry and job seniority are 
categorical variables, while married is dummy variable. Model A and Model B use log of 
income and log of total line (credit card line, quasi-credit card line, and loan line) as the 
dependent variable, respectively. For the regional variables, GDP growth is the mean growth 
from 2000 to 2005 and share of labor force enrolled in social security is data in 2005, both of 
which are obtained from Wei et al. (2011); the residential housing price is data in 2006. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistically significant at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
This paper empirically investigates whether males will increase their credit card 
spending and work harder to earn higher income in response to an increase in the sex 
ratios (of male to female). Empirical analyses using a unique dataset of credit card 
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account information covering 31 provinces and the regional variations in the sex 
ratio of young adults in China provide empirical evidence for a positive relationship 
between sex ratios and males’ credit card balance and working efforts. Instead of the 
competitive saving motive of parents with son in Wei et al. (2011), these findings 
highlight that young males themselves have competitive spending motive and are 
motivated to earn higher incomes by exacting their efforts. These findings also 
suggest that the rising sex ratio in China may also have contributed to China’s high 




Chapter 5.  Conclusion of Thesis 
Three essays in this thesis examine the connection between household 
consumption/finance and macroeconomic performance. The first essay finds 
adding housing consumption to the consumption bundle in a production economy 
has effect of lowering asset risk premia. In addition, it also finds that lower 
housing supply elasticity predicts lower equity risk premium and higher housing 
risk premium. The second essay shows that lower housing supply elasticity results 
in higher proportion of financial investment in stocks, and hence provides 
explanations for the geographic variations in household portfolio composition. 
Finally, the third essay finds that higher sex ratio gives rise to higher credit card 
spending and more worker efforts by young males. It suggests that the high GDP 
growth in China may be attributable to the competitive spending and labor supply 
behavior of young males induced by sex ratio imbalance.  
These findings not only advance our understanding of the interactions between 
household behavior and macroeconomy, but also could provide practical 
implications for household decisions. For instance, the results from the first essay 
suggest that we should lower our expectation of equity risk premium if we expect 
that housing supply would become less elastic. For instance, in the case of China, 
we may expect that the aggregate housing supply elasticity would become lower 
in the future than today due to gradually exhausted developable land and 
population concentration driven by urbanization. Therefore, we may foresee a rise 
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of aggregated stock price index due to lower aggregated housing supply elasticity 
and declining equity risk premium. The dependence of optimal proportion of 
investment in stocks on local housing supply elasticity shown in the second essay 
would suggest that households should adjust their investment strategies 
accordingly if they need to move to other locations. The second essay also 
provides evidence that there is a promising demand for instruments to hedge 
against housing consumption risk, an information useful to financial sector and 
government regulators.  
Last but not the least, there are several limitations in the current research. For 
instance, the role of housing as collateral is absent in the theoretical models in the 
first two essays. Since the collateral effect has been found important in affecting 
asset risk premia in a market with incomplete risk sharing, extension of current 
models with heterogeneous agents and housing collateral to check the robustness 
of current model implications would be interesting. While the housing in the 
theoretical model of the second essay mainly serves as a consumption goods, an 
extension of the model by allowing housing investment (housing as an asset) is 
also interesting. In addition, although the results in the second essays show that 
households have demand for financial instruments to hedge against housing 
consumption risk, the minimal trading activity of the CME S&P/Case-Shiller HPI 
futures since the initiation of trading in 2006 suggests that improving the 
attractiveness of a financial product to households is always challenging and 
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Appendix A: Log Approximation of the Stochastic Discount Factor 
This appendix shows steps of deriving (10) based on (9) in Chapter 2. Taking the 
log of both sides of equation (9) in Chapter 2, we have  
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(a2) 
Plug (a2) into (a1) and simplify, we can have: 
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Because the intratemporal optimization implies a one-to-one mapping between 
the price of housing service (relative to numeraire good price which is normalized 
to one) and the relative quantity 
     
1
, , 1t t t t t th t
t
t t t






   
   
   















 to obtain equation (10) in Chapter 2. 
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Appendix B: Outline of Extended Model with Growth in Chapter Two 
This appendix outlines an extended model with growth. The qualitative and 
quantitive properties of the model will be explored in future research.   
The production technology in the non-housing sector is represented by the AK 
production function with labor-augmenting technology: 




                  (b1) 
The productivity level, instead of being stationary, is assumed to have stochastic 
growth: 
               21ln ln , ~ (0, )t t t tA g A N                                 (b2) 
The technology process (b2) implies that the expected gross growth rate of 𝐴𝑡 is 





To ensure that the growth of housing consumption is the same as numeraire 
consumption and capital so that the balance growth path exists, the production of 
housing service is also subject to the aggregate productivity shock: 
                                           1 1ht t tH A K


                                                     (b3) 
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Given (b1) ~ (b3) and the nonseparable utility specification of (7) and (8) in 
Chapter 2, the agent’s optimization problem in the growth economy can be 
summarized as: 
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             (b4) 
where  tH  is represented by (b3).  
Since all the variables in (b4) grow at the same rate, the model can be transformed 





























 , the agent’s optimization problem in the transformed stationary 
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  (b5)  
Solving (b5) and transforming the stationary variable back to variables in the 
growth economy will allow us to examine whether connection between the 
elasticity of housing supply and asset risk premia still holds while matching 
import stylized facts about business and housing cycles.                      
 
